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ABSTRACT
BLADE RUNNERS AND ELECTRIC SHEEP IN 
CYBERSPACE: THE QUESTION OF HUMAN 
IDENTITY
DENISE DE MESQUITA CORRÊA
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1995
Supervising Professor: Sérgio Luiz Prado Bellei
The aim of this dissertation is to discuss the meaning of the term 
humanity in the postmodern context, through the analysis of two 
representative texts, Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream o f Electric 
Sheep? and Ridley Scott’s film adaptation of Dick’s literary work, Blade 
Runner. Taking as a theoretical basis American theorist Fredric Jameson’s 
reading of late capitalist society and French philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s 
concept of the simulacrum, this study focuses on the new subject which 
articulates the postmodern condition and all its contradictions. The 
introductory chapter characterizes the postmodern universe with a new 
treatment of time and space and the notion of the simulacrum. The first 
chapter analyzes Dick’s literary work and its dominant postmodern themes.
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The second chapter focuses on the visual narrative and its reading of a late 
capitalist society. The final chapter presents the notion of the individual 
that emerges from the symbiosis between humans and machines. The 
conclusion shows that the concept of humanity requires constant 
broadening and that the definition of humanity will depend on individual 
observers. Therefore, the postmodern emerging sense of the individual ends 
up in an open-ended process.
RESUMO
Esta dissertação tem como objetivo discutir o significado do termo 
humanidade, no contexto pós-moderno, através da análise de dois textos 
importantes: o romance Do Androids Dream o f  Electric Sheep? de Philip 
K. Dick, e a adaptação cinematográfica de Ridley Scott para a obra de 
Dick, Blade Runner. Tomando como base teórica a visão do americano 
Fredric Jameson sobre uma sociedade pós-capitalista e o conceito de 
simulacro do filósofo francês Jean Baudrillard, este estudo enfoca o novo 
indivíduo que articula a condição pós-moderna e todas as suas contradições.
O capítulo introdutório caracteriza o universo pós-moderno, com um novo 
tratamento do tempo e do espaço e a noção de simulacro. O primeiro 
capítulo analisa a obra literária de Dick e seus temas pós-modernos mais 
importantes. O segundo capítulo enfoca a narrativa visual e sua 
interpretação de uma sociedade pós-capitalista. O capítulo final apresenta a 
noção de indivíduo que surge da simbiose entre humanos e máquinas. A 
conclusão mostra que o conceito de humanidade requer uma expansão 
constante e que a definição de humanidade vai depender de cada 
observador. Portanto, a definição pós-moderna de indivíduo acaba num 
processo aberto.
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INTRODUCTION
"What does it mean to be human in the postmodern world?" In the 
course of finding an answer to this question, classical cyberpunk science 
fiction formulates its own definition of humanity by rearticulating the 
postmodern condition of the individual. The starting point to define 
humanity is, thus, a broadening of the notion of reality in which boundaries 
between reality and representation are no longer precise. Postmodernist 
texts attack conventional perceptions of reality and subvert the traditional 
paradigm of the subject and of its representation. Reality, composed of 
images or simulacra, can no longer be located and one's life is, then, 
governed by the new technology of simulacra.
The present study is an attempt to explore the science fiction idea 
that, in the age of technological reproduction, every feature of the human 
being can in principle be so precisely described and replicated that a 
machine can be made to simulate human life to the point that it can no 
longer be identified as human. The endeavor to identify the individual in 
the culture of simulacra foregrounds one of postmodernism's main concern, 
that is, the questioning of the existence of a specifically human identity.
In dystopias such as Philip K. Dick's novel Do Androids Dream o f  
Electric Sheep? and Ridley Scott's film Blade Runner, the same attempt to 
define humanity becomes blurred because the difference between human 
beings and replicants has, faded away. Replicants are perfect copies of 
human beings and as such they challenge the possibility of identifying the 
human in the postmodern world. The erasure of those features that 
distinguish natural beings from artificial ones reveals the inevitable 
outcome of mechanical reproduction, that is, the challenge to identify the 
origin of reality in the human self.
In Dick's novel and in Scott's film, even the most detailed 
examination of human behavior can fail to produce a final distinction 
between replicants and humans, since the former are perfect copies of a no 
longer existing "original". In this context, the technology of simulacra 
undermines the notion of an original by rejecting any differences between 
human beings and replicants.
Replicants as well have reached such a perfect simulation that they 
can not identify their own status. This aspect is highlighted by the female 
character Rachael, a replicant so perfect that, in the search for identity, she 
fails to grasp her artificial status. Rachael thus embodies the paradox that 
replicants have not only fallen within the frame of humanity but they have 
also surpassed their originals and, thus, threatened the possibility of 
distinguishing between reality and representation. In this context of
simulacra, everything is reduced to representation and the individual can no 
longer be located in this technology of reproduction.
The concern with the location of the individual in postmodern 
hyperspace is an indication of the present-day crisis of identity and of the 
need for new definitions. The prevailing picture of man in our days, one of 
uncertainty and self doubt, motivates writers to search for the origins of 
human identity. This search signals the loss of a self that can no 
longer be located behind his simulacrum.
In searching for a redefinition of the notion of humanity, 
postmodernism challenges conventional perceptions of reality and 
witnesses the disappearance of originality within the age of endless 
proliferation of copies. To discuss this point I will single out some of the 
relevant concepts for the postmodern redefinition of humanity, namely, the 
concept of simulacra, the new rearrangement of time and space, and, as a 
result, the new concept of the individual.
1. The Concept of Simulacra
In the postmodern world the term simulacrum becomes a hallmark 
because it generates a new concept for the word "real". The simulacrum, 
which is the central concept in French philosopher Jean Baudrillard's
theory of history, is "the identical copy for which no original has ever 
existed." (1) The real is not what can be reproduced but that which is 
always already reproduced, namely the hyperreal. In the hyperreal age "the 
real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and 
command models—and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite 
number of times." (2) Therefore the preoccupation with originality emerges 
because of the proliferation of copies which witnesses the disappearance of 
the referent.
The hyperreality mentioned above highlights the real as "the product 
of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without 
atmosphere." (3) In other words, the real will be generated by a conflation 
of models that nowhere touch a reality because in the hyperspace models 
reproduce themselves in an endless circuit where origins are unattainable 
by continuous movement. From this perspective, the real ceases to exist and 
one comes across a proliferation of models. This is the principle of 
technological reproduction which is incapable of demarcating the limits of 
reality and reproduction due to the rapid spread of copies. Needless to say, 
the result of this proliferation of copies is the loss of originality by the 
shattering of one's own identity.
In Dick's Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? and Scott's Blade 
Runner the concept of replicants illustrates the hyperreal world cited 
above, as they are perfect copies of human beings and as such they can
hardly be identified. Remaining within the frame of the simulacrum 
"replicants undermine the notion of an original by disavowing any 
differences between themselves and their creators." (4) It is particularly 
clear that humanity's new perspective, rather than simply reproducing the 
human race, is crossing the border of natural and artificial to become 
something new. Technology defines this new reality which pervades
individual lives in all aspects by the concept of replicants. The artificial
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beings become at last representatives of the new reality which rejects all 
notions of originality.
Steeped in the latest technological innovations, replicants have not 
only become a perfect simulation of human beings but they have also 
surpassed them. Replicants have what no human being appears to have:
Possessing the best of both worlds, cyborgs combine human 
attributes with the perfection of a technological anatomy, 
signifying a final breakdown of the boundaries between spirit 
and matter. (5)
The exchange of features between human beings and replicants reveals a 
collapse in the definition of humanity by the erasure of those attributes that 
used to distinguish natural beings from artificial ones. Replicants become 
humanized by the appropriation of human features, like feelings, whereas 
human beings become mechanized by the replacement of their bodies for 
artificial features.
By combining human features with the most advanced .technology, 
replicants become a final source of evidence for the threatening of a 
specific human identity. So, in the postmodern moment, human identity is 
dissolved by an image which evokes the real by a technological 
representation, namely replicants. The postmodern identity arises, thus, at 
the intersection of a variety of images which in a circular relationship 
exchange features and fragment one's own self. The conventional concept 
of humanity based on the autonomous self is thus challenged. The age of 
simulacra is thus an age in which everything is reduced to the image, to 
representation. Contemporary image not only mirrors life but structures and 
reproduces it and, thus, provides a new identity for the postmodern subject. 
In the words of Celeste Olalquiaga,
gradually, technological images have become the mirrors in 
which to look for an identity. Characterized by proliferation 
and consumptiveness, these ready-made images are easily 
interchangeable. Like all commodities, they are discardable 
identities. Mobile and perishable, their traits wane after a 
few uses. (6)
The postmodern identity is thus defined by the new technology of simulacra 
which dissolves the individual's sense of identity by the proliferation of 
copies. The emphatic reduplication of copies shatters the referent and 
replaces it by repetition. Given this point, the task of the postmodern 
individual is to establish his identity from transitory images which circulate 
endlessly in a space without depth.
Baudrillard's concept of the simulacrum implies precisely the inability 
to locate the referent in the presence of a depthless image. In a depthless 
world, everything circulates in a space without depth, in an endless circuit. 
In other words, the depthless image "is a derealized simulacrum (filmic 
images without density) which can not be filled out by a determinate 
identity." (7) The replicants presented in Dick's novel and Scott's film are 
examples of depthless images that threaten human identity. The articulated 
pictures of natural and artificial beings can not be distinguished as images 
of either because none of them holds a particular identity.
In a world devoid of originality, the simulacrum, by abolishing the 
referent, can not be other than a perfect copy of itself. This is to deny a 
theory of correspondence between images and their objects of reference. As 
Baudrillard argues, the image "bears no relation to any reality whatever: it 
is its own pure simulacrum, a copy only of itself." (8) Accordingly, in the 
postmodern world, one comes across a deconstruction of the opposition 
between images and reality for "the object world itself-now become a set of 
texts or simulacra," (9) where the picture itself, that is, the sign, has 
become reality.
At issue in the context above is the very definition of the hyperreal 
which, in Baudrillard's account, means a coincidence with itself rather than 
a copy of the real. In his words,
8(i)n the absence of rules of the game, things become caught 
up in their own game: images become more real than the real; 
cinema itself becomes more cinema than cinema, in a kind of 
vertigo in which (to return to our initial problem, that of 
resemblance) it does more than resemble itself and escape in 
its own logic, in the very perfection of its own model. (10)
In the hyperreality of pervasive simulacra, the principle of representation is 
displaced by the principle of reproduction:
The principle of representation, which worked as long as a 
certain notion of reality could guarantee their secondary 
status—the real as a model for representation—have been 
overturned by a multiplication of images that has literally left 
no space for such distinction. (11)
Such an observation emphasizes the postmodern concern with the image 
which simultaneously effaces and valorizes the real and undermines the 
very possibility of representation.
Being as real as, or even more real than, the reality they replicate, 
replicants challenge the idea of human beings as models so that at a certain 
point, the question which emerges is whether the model, namely the human 
being, is not already a model itself. Technology ultimately challenges the 
definition of humanity, as in the case of artificial intelligence:
(w)hat is crucial in the debates on artificial intelligence is 
that an inversion has taken place which is the fate of every 
successful metaphor: one first tries to simulate human thought 
with the computer, bringing the model as close as possible to 
the human 'original', until at a certain point matters reverse 
and the question emerges: what if this ’model' is already a 
model of the 'original' itself, what if human intelligence itself
operates like a computer, is ’programmed', etcetera? (12)
In this context, the notion of originality and of truth have to be redefined. 
As Baudrillard puts it, reality has been so perfectly reproduced by 
technology that representation has become true, for "the simulacrum is 
never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that 
there is none. The simulacrum is true." (13)
2. The Postmodern Idea of Time and Space
The problem of defining humanity in the postmodern world is also 
related to the contemporary concern with locating the individual within 
some postmodern hyperspace. In this context, the search for identity 
becomes also a function of place and time, that is, if one does not know 
where one is one probably does not know who one is. In other words, if  one 
can not locate oneself in space and time one can not find one's own 
identity. And space and time, in hyperreality, have been redefined since the 
advent of technologies which foreground the collapse of the boundaries 
between the two dimensions conventionally thought of as separate:
Spatial and temporal coordinates end up collapsing: space is 
no longer defined by depth and volume, but rather by a 
cinematic (temporal) repetition, while the sequence of time is 
frozen in an instant of (spatial) immobility. (14)
The new sense of time and space provided by post-industrial technological 
changes stresses a collapse in temporality, characterized by a new 
rearrangement of the historical time; and a collapse in the spatial boundary 
which challenges the conventional limits of space.
The postmodern moment is, then, portrayed by a temporal disruption 
in which all boundaries between past, present, and future are effaced. 
Incapable of demarcating the limits of historical continuity, postmodern 
timelessness locates the individual in a perpetual present time. The present 
contains both past and future, as advanced technology makes signs from the 
past and the future circulate in the present. In this way, rather than viewing 
events in a linear model of historical time, that is, from earlier to later 
times, postmodernism regards history as collage. Postmodernism articulates 
this collage as a narration made up of a series of multiple perspectives in 
which the signs from the past, the present, and the future circulate together 
in a nondogmatic way. As the American theorist Fredric Jameson writes,
(t)he postmodern is ... the force field in which very different 
kinds of cultural impulses - what Raymond Williams has 
usefully termed 'residual' and 'emergent' forms of cultural 
production - must make their way. If we do not achieve some 
general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a 
view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random 
difference, a coexistence of a host of distinct forces whose 
effectivity is undecidable. (15)
Therefore, postmodernism rejects the idea of a general consensus and 
asserts the preference for a process of differentiation which undermines the
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feelings of continuity. The past has become "a vast collection of images, a 
multitudinous photographic simulacrum." (16)
Freed finally from temporal restraints, postmodernism succeeds in 
representing the past by reconstructing it from images that convey a 
nostalgic feeling. The result of the new historical situation is that "we are 
condemned to seek History by way of our own pop images and simulacra of 
that history, which itself remains forever out of reach." (17) Therefore, 
nostalgia texts maintain a lively presence of the past within the present by 
means of representations. This is the case of Dick's Do Androids Dream o f  
Electric Sheep? and Scott's Blade Runner, which reappropriate images 
from the past and keep them alive circulating among advanced 
technologies. To illustrate this point one may consider the Greek column in 
Tyrrel's house. The column becomes the hallmark of a past which 
circulates among replicants and computers, namely the signs of a 
technological world.
Such a pragmatic view of temporality is well suited to the postmodern 
individual who tries to shape its identity by holding a sense of continuity 
from past, present, and future time for, as Jameson states, "the personal 
identity is itself the effect of a certain temporal unification of past and 
future with the present before me." (18) In this way, one’s version of oneself 
depends on the past which proves to exist only in terms of the present. 
Paradoxically, the past suddenly acquires a great significance for
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postmodern man, for when one connects past and present one finds the 
narrative thread that supports one's own historical identity.
By breaking the rules of historical continuity, the postmodern 
individual is condemned to live in a perpetual present time. Replicants in 
Dick's novel and Scott's film articulate this issue very clearly, as they are 
condemned to a life composed only of a present and lack a sense of 
continuity with the past. Deprived of past and future, replicants lose their 
existence over time and, consequently, the sense of who they are. In 
Olalquiaga's account,
(t)o counter this threat to humanity, people of both the space 
age and the postmodern age have attempted to imagine 
themselves as characters from another time, belonging either 
to the future or to the past, and hoping to retain a sense of 
identity through that vicarious experience. Yet the irony of 
this schizophrenic exchanging of identities is that 
vicariousness is the ability to become, however fleetingly, 
another—exactly what the fear of dehumanization tries so 
hard to avoid. (19)
In Dick's novel and Scott's film, history turns out to be a human trace which 
threatens replicants' lives. One of the greatest difficulties in achieving a 
human status is thus the disappearance of the historical referent which 
renders replicants entirely unstable.
With individual lives pervaded by technology in almost all levels, man 
becomes aware of his own existence over time and extended his control 
over it. The impact of this particular scientific advance on humanity is great
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because it generates new systems of concepts and values which challenges 
the limits of time. As Olalquiaga writes:
(h)igh technology and the space age retro fashion flatly deny 
the passing of time: the former by producing systems, such as 
cyborgs, apparently immune to natural deterioration; the 
latter by defying continuity in the replacement of time with 
space. (20)
In this way, postmodern time acquires meaning when it is replaced by space 
for "we no longer perceive ourselves as continuity but as location, or rather 
dislocation in the urban/suburban cosmos." (21)
Another aspect of hyperreal space is the blurring of the spatial 
frontiers of the body. Demarcations of the limits of the body become 
difficult when copies of the body cannot be different from the original, as 
in replicants. A world devoid of spatial boundaries, thus, challenges one's 
identity as the conventional limits of one's own body is transcended. The 
body can no longer be compared to something different, which would 
function as "the last refuge of identity." (22) In this way the postmodern 
individual ends up in a state of despair to preserve his identity, for the body 
has been replaced by technological innovations:
(n)o longer distinguishable from computers, the body is 
thought of as a system whose parts are perfectible and 
replaceable. Slowly, body and computer have begun to 
exchange their peculiar traits: the body becomes mechanized 
at the same rate that technology is made human. (23)
The exchange of features between the organic and the technological bodies 
portrays a condition of deterioration and fragmentation of the self. One is 
unable to generate an account of one's own body and, consequently, of one's 
own identity. Therefore, establishing one's image has become the most 
challengeable task for postmodern man.
Defying a perception of space by the fusion of organic and 
technological bodies, man transcends his present state to become something 
other. This successful mutation is portrayed by replicants in Dick's and 
Scott's texts. "Both an organic and a technological body, the fictional 
cyborg represents the ultimate spatial transgression, an accomplishment 
that it shares with holograms." (24) As has been noted, technology has 
raised the confusion of spatial boundaries and stressed the postmodern 
phenomenon of exchange of features, leaving room for an open-ended 
evolutionary process. In this way, the concept of humanity is to be found in 
change rather than in an established image.
When neither organicity nor technology prevails, man reaches a stage 
in which one is unable to assure who is who and who is what, who is 
machine and who a human being. Replicants have reached this stage 
because they "develop in time the only feature that distinguished them from 
their makers: emotions." (25) The inability to distinguish replicants from 
their originals convey both, replicants and human beings, a sense of loss. 
Postmodern hyperspace
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has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the 
individual human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map 
its position in a mappable world. (26)
At issue in the paragraph above is the very concept of a psychological 
phenomenon called psychasthenia. Olalquiaga writes that,
(d)efined as a disturbance in the relation between self and 
surrounding territory, psychasthenia is a state in which the 
space defined by the coordinates of the organism's own body 
is confused with represented space. (27)
The postmodern space widened its scope and exceeded the human capacity 
to comprehend and direct it. Therefore, dislocated in the postmodern 
hyperspace, human beings and replicants live in places where referentiality 
is lost. In Dick's novel and Scott's film, modern and old architecture stand 
side by side along with people from different origins conveying a feeling of 
referential absence which situates natural and artificial beings in all places 
and all times. As a result, characters in both texts establish a fragmented 
image of themselves and their world.
3. The Postmodern Concept of the Individual
Remaining within the field of a technological world, the postmodern
emerging sense of the individual is a result of the collapse of boundaries 
between human beings and machines. The blurring of frontiers between the 
artificial and the natural, the temporal and the spatial entails the destruction 
of a unified concept of the human self. In stressing the interdependence of 
all phenomena, postmodernism challenges the idea of the unified self. 
Paradoxically, at the starting point for a new concept of humanity stand 
replicants whose presence challenges the very possibility of a specific 
human identity. In the postmodern world, the main difference between 
human beings and replicants is a matter of degree rather than kind. From a 
contemporary point of view, one can argue that at least three conditions 
have to fall into place before finding a definition for the term humanity. 
First of all, the new sense of time; second the new sense of space; finally 
the rearrangement of the concepts of natural and artificial.
All these variants are displayed in the two representative examples of 
postmodern texts to be discussed here, namely Dick's science fiction novel 
Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? and Scott's film adaptation of 
Dick's novel, Blade Runner. Both works unveil the standardized motif of 
science fiction texts, that is, the thematic of a human and inhuman 
symbiosis which leads to a collapse o f the definitions of natural and 
artificial. By means of different aesthetic forms, Dick's and Scott's texts 
reinforce the postmodern concern with locating the real in a society full of 
fakes and imitations.
Although Dick's novel and Scott's film offer a wide range of aspects 
to be analyzed, the present study focuses mainly on the problematization of 
the real in a postmodern society. Obviously, the metaphor of natural and 
artificial described in both texts is used in relation to the theme of 
technology. The novel's and. the film's emphatic employments of 
technology suggest that technology is a threat. The problems related to a 
new reality pervaded by technological changes will then be analyzed here in 
the two different narrative forms, of literature and film.
Another aspect of my investigation resides in an underlying premise of
science fiction narratives which undertake the theme of defining humanity.
(Moi:<v<? T 6 M P  P ^ I N C 'T A l
My main intention is to analyze the variants of the robot motif which, in a 
postmodern context, are used to propose a redefinition of the term 
humanity. Besides, my analysis will also deal with the notion of the 
individual which has been redefined according to a radically new order of 
things, which is best represented by Fredric Jameson’s reading of late 
capitalist society and Jean Baudrillard’s account of the era of simulation.
In order to proceed with the investigation, I have divided the study 
into four major stages. This introductory discussion of the postmodern 
universe will be followed by the treatment of time and space and the notion 
of the simulacrum in Dick’s literary work. The aim will be to analyze how 
Dick’s novel deals with the notion of fakery and imitation. I will next 
present a more detailed analysis of Scott's film. By raising the postmodern
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world I intend to see how Baudrillard's concept is presented in the 1982 
version of Blade Runner. Then, it will be time to demonstrate the 
importance of the visual narrative and its contribution to the great success 
of the film. Finally, I will analyze issues related to the notion of the 
individual that can emerge from the symbiosis between humans and 
machines. My purpose is, thus, to define the term humanity in the 
postmodern realm.
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CHAPTER I
Dick’s Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? 
And Its Dominant Postmodern Themes
In this chapter, I shall first present Dick’s novel, then review its 
dominant postmodern themes and, finally, articulate the issues which shape 
the postmodern identity. By raising the quest for identity I attempt to fit 
Baudrillard’s call for a new definition of reality and Jameson’s reading of 
late capitalist society to Dick’s novel. In a world where the real becomes a 
set of representations and individuality is completely manipulated by false 
memory implants, technology redefines reality by questioning old concepts 
and proposing new definitions in a renewal of knowledge arrived at the 
destruction of any unified conception of truth.
A key point emerges when the cultural logics of late capitalism 
provides new versions of the postmodern individual. In Dick’s novel, 
androids replace real people and become reconstructed bodies. The 
reconstructed body becomes a commodity which replaces old values and
threatens the established concept of humanity. The dilemma in Dick’s 
characters is, thus, to find an essential humanity in an endless 
representation of reality in which the cultural logics of the simulacrum, 
with its simulated appearance counting as reality, interact with the logics of 
late capitalism and its values of utility and prestige.
The postmodern commodity system radically alters and shapes the 
meaning people give to themselves and to the world around. The aim of this 
chapter is to show how Dick’s characters achieve understanding of the 
fragmentary reality in which they live and how they build up new systems 
of values and concepts. I begin by defining the novel’s genre.
1. The Novel’s Genre: Cyberpunk
Dick’s Do Androids Dream o f  Electric Sheep? is a cyberpunk 
science fiction novel, namely a science fiction text which incorporates 
elements of postmodernism, or in Brian McHale’s words, “a science fiction 
which derives certain of its elements from postmodernist mainstream 
fiction which itself has, in its turn, already been ‘science-fictionized’ to 
some greater or lesser degree.”(7,) Fredric Jameson identifies it “as the 
supreme literary expression if not of postmodernism, then of late 
capitalism itself.”(2,) On the whole, cyberpunk texts have a cycling process 
that conflate elements from both science fiction and postmodernist texts.
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Dick’s novel joins the most significant features of postmodernist 
texts: the limitations on human knowledge of truth and reality, with the 
traditional science fiction repertoire of space ships, futuristic weaponry, 
androids, other worlds, etc. The narrative gives legitimacy to the identity 
crisis in our technological era, a common issue in Dick’s texts. As Scott 
Bukatman explains,
the central characteristic of Dick’s protagonists involves their 
crisis of subjectivity; crisis which begin when the categories 
of the real and the rational begin to dissolve their 
boundaries. (3)
In the quest for a new subject, Dick’s narrative articulates the following 
postmodern features: a new concept of “real”; a new depthlessness; a 
schizophrenic condition of time; a loss of subjectivity; a process of 
obsolescence of commodities; pastiche, as an appropriation of the past; a 
new logic of space; and the waning of affect which grounds intense 
emotional experiences.
2. Entering the Novel’s Terrain
The novel is a nightmare vision of the futuristic, postmodern society 
which portrays a place destroyed by the nuclear war in the year 1992. The 
world in Dick’s text is, at the opening panel, being threatened by extra- 
clever androids, namely the Nexus-6 brain units. These androids, who
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surpass many human beings in terms of intelligence, were created by the 
system’s largest manufacturer of humanoid robots, the Rosen Association. 
Rick Deckard, a skilled bounty hunter, is assigned to retire the renegade 
androids. In order to detect the Nexus-6 android types, or replicas of 
human beings, Deckard uses the Voigt-Kampff Altered Scale. The scale is 
needed as a device to determine whether individuals are natural beings 
because some androids do not know what they really are.
As the story unfolds, one becomes aware that Deckard’s postmodern 
world is a place of total passivity where technology pervades individuals’ 
lives at their most intimate level. Even memories are artificially implanted. 
In this setting in which there is no established hierarchy of truth, the 
cultural logic of the simulacrum interacts with the economic logic of 
contemporary capitalism. Such place is an allegory of the consumer society 
organized by the logic of use and market value which turns everything into 
a commodity that is bought and sold in markets. Thus genuine animals in 
Deckard’s world, are important as particularly valuable commodities.
The near eradication of Earth’s animal life other than man 
has resulted in the measurement of wealth by ownership of 
live-stock, and in accordance with a catalogue that gives 
current values as if for antiques or second-hand cars, people 
acquire goats, sheep and cows as status symbols. If they can’t 
afford genuine animals, they settle for working models. (4)
In this way, artificial animals have become commodities that circulate in a 
society full of fakes and imitations.
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In this unreal world of simulation, to acquire a live animal not only 
gives status but also measures a person’s wealth. Deckard, for example, 
uses the money he makes in his search for renegade androids to buy genuine 
animals. This question is addressed right at the opening of the story when 
Deckard tells his neighbor Bill Barbour that he wants to buy a genuine 
sheep to replace the artificial sheep he owns. Paradoxically, this artificial 
sheep has already replaced a natural sheep Deckard received from his 
wife’s father. In this replacement of natural with artificial and vice-versa, 
the novel characterizes the commodity production of a consumer society.
2.1. The New Concept of “Real”
Deckard’s world commodifies individuals, human emotions, status, 
prestige, time and place. The result of such commodification is a change in 
the concept of reality. The ‘real’ has become a commodity transformed 
into something that has market value. In this context, people and objects are 
easily manipulated according to society’s interest. They become 
reconstructed “truths” and turn out to be more real than reality itself, for 
they articulate a set of values which displace old forms of truth and 
introduce a new logic to the world. The real, to use Baudrillard’s words, 
has become the hyperreal. In a hyperreal world, the individual becomes 
discourse and simulacrum.
The apocalyptic image of the future portrayed in the novel reflects 
the fear of technology with its rejection of all notions of originality and 
subjectivity. Dick articulated this idea in his use of androids. Androids have 
overturned the notion of a uniquely human identity of natural beings for 
they simulate human beings so perfectly that they end up being 
indistinguishable from their originals. The real is, thus, confused with its 
image.
Living in this unreality, or hyperreality, the individual in Dick’s novel 
must define reality according to its surface reflection, which can easily be 
commodified. This commodified world becomes unstable and 
ungovernable, for the ‘real world’ becomes a set of reconstructed truths. 
The politics of truth in the novel displaces literal models of truth and 
knowledge and establishes new codes which reduce everything to 
commodified myth.
Made up of a discontinuous series of simulations, Deckard’s 
postmodern world, organized by the logic of the simulacrum, conveys the 
idea that things and people have lost their early connections with origins, 
as the originals have been replaced by copies. Artificial beings in Dick’s 
novel articulate this issue with precision, for they are technologically 
developed to simulate natural beings and reproduce the ‘real’ so perfectly 
that they can hardly be identified. This is the case of androids, who 
simulate human beings, and artificial animals, which replace genuine
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animals. The former,
the Nexus-6 android types ... surpassed several classes of 
human specials in terms of intelligence. In other words, 
androids equipped with the Nexus-6 brain unit had from a 
sort of rough, pragmatic, no-nonsense standpoint evolved 
beyond a major- but inferior-segment of mankind. (5)
Artificial animals, in turn, acquire a heightened significance because they 
give status and are signals of wealth. Both, natural animals and human 
beings, reinforce the postmodern anxious concern with simulation, for they 
become symbolic of a society which over-valued reality and its lived, 
emotional experiences as these real experiences are becoming extinct. The 
society presented in Dick’s novel must be thought of in terms of new 
sociological formations. These tend to produce anxiety in the individual 
who is always faced with commodification to the extent that one can never 
distinguish between reality and simulacra. The Nexus-6 group of androids 
is of course the main example of this postmodern reality.
2.2. The Nexus-6 Android Group
The Nexus-6 android type, part human, part machine, is almost 
indistinguishable from real people. These artificial beings, whose life-span 
is only four years, are genetically programed and made from organic 
material. They are so perfectly manufactured by the Rosen Association that 
some of them do not know their own status, whether humans or androids. 
Rachael Rosen articulates this dilemma very clearly:
28
To Eldon Rosen, who slumped morosely by the door of the 
room, he said, “Does she know?” Sometimes they didn’t; 
false memories had been tried various times, generally in the 
mistaken idea that through them reactions to testing would be 
altered.
Eldon Rosen said, “No. We programmed her completely. But
I think toward the end she suspected.”^
Individuality is completely manipulated by false memory implants which 
grant androids a false history. Rachael is unable to identify her status 
because her memories are drawn from various images. She becomes a 
“terminal of multiple networks,” as Baudrillard puts it. Because of the 
endless proliferation of images, androids are only identified by means of 
the Voigt-Kampff scale, which reveals the so-called flattening of affect, 
namely a schizophrenic characteristic which unveils a defective emotional 
life.
The dialogue cited above shows Deckard talking to Eldon Rosen, from 
the Rosen Association, about Rachael. Like the other Nexus-6 androids, she 
is the latest development of technology in terms of artificial beings. 
Rachael is apparently human and has been raised by Eldon Rosen as a 
family member. When Deckard asks Eldon for the first testee to undergo 
the Voigt-kampff test, Rachael offers to take it and Eldon challenges 
Deckard:
Rachael said, “Give me the test.”
“Why?” Rick said, puzzled.
Speaking up, Eldon Rosen said hoarsely, “We selected her as
your first subject. She may be an android. We’re hoping you 
can tell.’Y7)
The test confirms Rachael’s status as an android. She is literally reduced to 
a machine status, bereft of any empathy,
He put his pencil down, shut off the beam of light, removed 
the adhesive patch from her cheek. “You’re an android,” he 
said. “That’s the conclusion of the testing,” he informed 
her—or rather it. (8)
Rachael, thus, embodies the precarious condition of the individual in a late 
capitalist society where people become objects to be manipulated. She is 
reduced to a commodified status which turns ‘her’ into ‘it’. In other words, 
she is dehumanized and regarded as an object which circulates inside 
Deckard’s simulated world.
Another example of a commodified status is Phil Resch, who is 
treated by Deckard as “the man beside him, or rather, the thing beside 
him. ”(9) Both Rachael and Phil differ from human beings in terms of the 
signifiers that people attach to them. They are classified as objects, not as 
persons, by undergoing a test. This successful mutation of status shows how 
postmodern society produces the concept of an open-ended evolutionary 
process which manipulates people and objects placing the individual in a 
world of uncertainty where reality can not be taken at face value. The result 
is an individual frightened with feelings of anxiety.
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Technologically developed to be the same type as Pris Stratton, one of 
the Nexus-6 androids who escaped, Rachael feels the fragility of her 
condition when she has to eliminate Pris:
‘That last goddamn Nexus-6 type,’ Rachael said, enunciating 
with effort, ‘is the same type as 1 am / She stared down at the 
bedspread, found a thread, and began rolling it into a pellet.
‘Didn’t you notice the description? It’s of me, too. She may 
wear her hair differently and dress differently - she may even 
have bought a wig. But when you see her you’ll know what I 
mean.’ She laughed sardonically. ‘It’s a good thing the 
association admitted I’m an andy; otherwise you’d probably 
have gone mad when you caught sight of Pris Stratton. Or 
thought she was mq.’ (10)
The simulated world where they live, which is based on reproduction, 
brings about a crisis of identity, as the individual is never sure about his/its 
own status. The individual is reduced to a code and his essential self is lost 
under ideological assumptions. Rachael becomes representative of such 
postmodern individual who witnesses the disappearance of his autonomous 
self.
For all that, Rachael’s sense of identity deepens and she is faced with 
the challenge of being replaced by Pris, namely the android she and 
Deckard are hunting. In other words, Rachael is confronted with the 
paradoxical situation of hunting none other than herself:
‘Something like that; there goes I. My god; maybe that’s 
what’ll happen. In the confusion you’ll retire me, not her.
And she can go back to Seattle and live my life. I never felt 
this way before. We are machines, stamped out like bottle
caps. It’s an illusion that I—I personally—really exist; I’m
representative of a type.’ She shuddered. (11)
The passage above evokes the postmodern process of simulation in which 
the original can hardly be located and a copy replaces another copy in an 
endless circuit. Accordingly, Rachael, a copy of human beings, can be 
replaced by Pris, an android with the same type as Rachael. Rachael ends 
up being a duplicate. As Deckard says, “there is no Pris ... ‘Only Rachael 
Rosen, over and over again.” (12)
2.3. Depthless Images
Within the process of simulation, identities become discardable and 
reveal the precarious condition of the individual. Rachael functions within 
a system of classification which is identifiably artificial. She is, however, 
confused by her own image. Such image shapes her in terms of her surface 
appearance only. In this way, Rachael becomes an example of the 
postmodern depthless image which does not hold a particular identity. As 
Jameson puts it, the human being is itself commodified and transformed 
into its own image. Images and signs, Baudrillard argues, come to stand for 
objects and commodities that make up everyday life. In an endless chain of 
signifiers, people become commodities with discardable identities. Like all 
commodities, Rachael’s constructed “se lf’ can easily be discarded and 
replaced by another “human” machine.
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The result of such multiplication of images is a crisis of identity 
because, as Olalquiaga puts it,
images are central to the shaping of identity: largely constituted 
by the perception of the self as a separate totality, identity must 
resort to an image to acquire a sense of wholeness. Without such 
a reflection of the self onto a literal or figurative mirror, self- 
perception remains fragmented—exactly as if we had never seen 
our own images in full. (13)
The postmodern individual is, thus, constantly searching for confirmation 
of its existence, as his/her/its emerging self brings about a feeling of 
fragmentation. This sense of fragmentation portrays a condition Jameson 
identifies as characteristic of late capitalism, that of schizophrenic 
individuals.
2.4. Schizophrenia
As Jameson puts it, schizophrenia is a breakdown in the relationship 
of “signifiers among each other.” (14) Schizophrenia appears “in the form 
of a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers.”(15) These fragmented 
signifiers characterize a new relationship with time and history. As Jenny 
Wolmark writes,
Since understanding of the relationship between past, present 
and future, and of temporality generally, depends on the inter­
relations between signifiers, once the chain of meaning is 
broken the schizophrenic subject is condemned to live in 
what Jameson describes as ‘a perpetual present’. (16)
The postmodern individual is introduced to a new logic of time which 
reproduces fragmented experiences and establishes new temporal codes,.
In the temporal loss proposed by late capitalism, the individual 
experiences a behavioral disruption. In Dick’s novel, androids stand at the 
core of such process of temporal loss. Androids have neither past nor 
future, they are isolated from history and their lives are limited to the 
present moment, as they are programed to have a life-span of only four 
years. They live, as it were, in the present only. This question of 
temporality applies also to the issue of child bearing. Androids, of course, 
can not bear children as a signal of continuity and immortality through 
time.
Devoided of any history, androids lack a sense of continuity with the 
past and experience the fragility of their status since they are forced to 
accept the brevity of their existence. The result is a sense of fragmentation 
of the self as the structure of time that gives unity to the individual breaks 
down. Only when one connects past and present one finds the narrative 
thread that supports one’s identity. In this way, the past acquires a 
heightened significance for the postmodern man whose history becomes a 
proof of a previous existence which grants him the right to exist and to 
understand h i m s.e 1 f.as...an,effect ofpre vi ous codes.
Androids’ lives are, on the other hand, undermined by the past.
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Because androids have neither past nor future, they have no existence over 
time and lack the connection with their original selves. They have no 
history, and without a history they are fated to forge the consciousness of 
their selves. They experience the fragility of their existence because they 
cannot establish a contact with their selves and are thus prevented from 
achieving an understanding of their reality. They ultimately experience a 
temporal breakdown which is typical of schizophrenic individuals.
The schizophrenic temporality of androids, characteristic of the 
postmodern condition, finally reduces them to discardable commodities. 
They can be retired, that is, eliminated from a “normal” productive life by 
being withdrawn from the market,
Rick liked to think of them that way; it made his job 
palatable. In retiring—i.e. killing—an andy he did not violate 
the rule of life laid down by Mercer. (17)
As the temporality of androids is thus manipulated by their creators, they 
feel the anguish of those who never know their life time,
2.5. Loss of Subjectivity
The impossibility of locating the individual within ‘the endless chain 
of signifiers’ of the postmodern world provides the individual with a sense 
of loss. The postmodern individual thus permanently fears the void of 
subjectivity. Ironically, such concern is a common trait between human 
beings and androids in Deckard’s world. Both live in a world of
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multinational capitalism in which none of a person’s feature is really his, 
everything has been artificially implanted, even one’s most intimate 
memories. Humans and androids experience a feeling of complete void 
conveyed by the destruction of the self. They share this trait and experience 
a sense of fragmentation of reality:
You’re not an escaped android on Earth illegally; you’re the 
property of the Rosen Association, used as a sale device for 
prospective migrants.’ (18)
In this passage, Eldon Rosen tries to comfort Rachael when she becomes 
aware of her artificial status. Rachael’s status is commodified and she 
becomes a sales device for emigrants. As such, she is overwhelmed by a 
sense of void.
In his search for androids, Deckard also experiences his own loss of 
subjecthood. When Luba Luft, one of the Nexus-6 female androids who has 
just realized her artificial status, asks Deckard if he had ever undergone the 
test, he is filled with self-doubt,
‘An android,’ he said, ‘doesn’t care what happens to another 
android. That’s one of the indications we look for.’
‘Then,’ Miss Luft said, ‘you must be an android.’
That stopped him; he stared at her. (19)
Deckard is confused because the undermining of his humanist assumptions 
challenges his unified sense of identity and his view of reality. Near the 
end of the novel, Deckard also experiences a similar feeling when he finds
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out the truth about Mercerism.
Deckard’s reaction to the threat of losing his identity points to the 
postmodern condition of the individual and all its contradictions. How 
different is the “real” Deckard from a “copy” like Luba? The comparison 
raises the very question of simulation and of the possibility/impossibility of 
boundaries between reality and copies. Can one identify the real in the age 
of technological reproduction? Unable to see beyond his own condition, 
Deckard remains trapped in his own world by technology. He identifies 
androids only by means of the Voigt-Kampff scale, which finally seems to 
be unreliable. When challenged by Rachael and later by Luba to take the 
test, Deckard’s uneasiness reveals his uncertainty about being human:
‘Maybe there was once a human who looked like you, and 
somewhere along the line you killed him and took his place.
And your superiors don’t know. ’
She smiled. As if inviting him to agree.
‘Let’s get on with the test,’ he said, getting out the sheets of 
questions.
‘I’ll take the test,’ Luba Luft said, ‘if you take it first.’
Again he stared at her, stopped in his track. (20)
The test remains finally only a poor indication of one’s human existence. 
Identity revealed by technological means ultimately proves to be useless.
2.6. Commodities and Deterioration
The scale used for the test is just another discardable commodity in
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the late capitalist market. Like the discardable identity of individuals, it can 
be easily replaced. The scale has become a commodity in a new system of 
legitimation which values new representations of reality and undermines 
previous codes. The impact of this scientific conquest on humanity is 
significant because it reduces the individual to a “human” commodity.
Although the scale worked out to identify Rachael’s status, there is 
clear evidence that the device is already obsolete. The Voigt-Kampff scale 
can not keep pace with the development of new machines and thus becomes 
rapidly useless. This accelerated process of obsolescence of commodities is 
identified in the novel as ‘kippleization’:
The apartments in which no one lives—hundreds of them and 
all full of the possessions people had, like family photographs 
and clothes. Those that died couldn’t take anything and those 
who emigrated didn’t want to. This building, except for my 
apartment, is completely kipple-ized.
“Kipple-ized?” She did not comprehend.
‘Kipple is useless objects, like junk mail or match folders 
after you use the last match or gum wrappers of yesterday’s 
homepaper. (21)
‘Kippleization’ as the proliferation of commodities is, moreover, an endless
process:
When nobody’s around, kipple reproduces itself. For instance, 
if you go to bed leaving any kipple around your apartment, 
when you wake up the next morning there’s twice as much of 
it. It always gets more and more. (22)
Kippleization sustains the illusion that nothing is permanent, as things must 
be quickly replaced in late capitalist society.
At the heart of the process of obsolescence lies the Nexus-6 androids 
whose four-year life span is discarded by more sophisticated models. 
Androids do not die because of their age but because they are replaced by 
new models. In Olalquiaga’s words,
Often made for a very short life span, these artifacts die 
without age marks, still shining new. Their deterioration is 
caused more by abandonment than by use: they are left to the 
decomposition occasioned by lack of maintenance and often 
relegated to the realm of trash. (23)
Androids, like all machines, begin to desintegrate and become useless: “We 
are not born; we don’t grow up; instead of dying from illness or old age we 
wear out like ants” (24) These words, said by Rachael, reveal the 
precarious condition of the individuals and machines in a post-industrial 
society of commodities. Human beings, like androids, wear out and vanish 
in the dust. This society proposes a new aesthetic of decay that reduces the 
new and old, waste and garbage, human beings and machines to discardable 
commodities.
Deckard’s post-industrial world is characterized by urban decay. 
Empty, old and dark buildings are filled up with self perpetuating increase 
of waste and garbage:
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He lived alone in this deteriorating blind building of a 
thousand uninhabited apartments which, like all its 
counterparts, fell, day by day, into greater entropic ruin.
Eventually everything within the building would merge, 
would be faceless and identical, mere pudding-like kipple 
piled to the ceiling of each apartment. And, after that, the 
uncared-for building itself would settle into shapelessness, 
buried under the ubiquity of the dust. (25)
John Isidore lives in such a place. He, like the building; is in a process of 
decaying,
So maybe it’s I, John Isidore said to himself Maybe when 
you deteriorate back down the ladder of evolution as I have, 
when you sink into the tomb world slough of being a 
special—well, best to abandon that line of inquiry. Nothing 
depressed him more than the moments in which he contrasted 
his current mental powers with what he had formerly 
possessed. Every day he declined in sagacity and vigour. He 
and the thousands of other specials throughout Terra, all of 
them moving toward the ash heap. Turning into living 
kipple. (26)
Human beings as well as buildings are thus literally and metaphorically in a 
state of despair, as theirs is a condition of entropic disintegration.
The postmodern politics of waste extends to people and places and 
grants a new meaning to the postmodern scenario of space without time:
Thinking this he wondered if Mozart had had any intuition 
that the future did not exist, that he had already used up his 
little time. Maybe I have, too, Rick thought as he watched the 
rehearsal move along. This rehearsal will end, the 
performance will end, the singers will die, eventually the last 
score of the music will be destroyed in one way or another; 
finally the name ‘Mozart’ will vanish, the dust will have won.
If not on this planet then another. (27)
Hence people and places do not get old but they are left to decompose and 
vanish in the dust. The accumulation of dust provides, thus, a feeling of 
depression highlighted in Dick’s novel by John Isidore’s apartment 
building: “the rubbish-littered, lifeless roof of his apartment building as 
always depressed him "(28) In Isidore’s building, everything is transformed 
into ruins and becomes kipple. The result of such politics of kippleization 
is a compulsive accumulation of objects which produce a reappropriation of 
the past in the form of pastiche.
2.7. Pastiche
As Jameson remarks, the postmodern cultural logic of time, erases all 
boundaries between past and present. Deckard’s is the postmodern world in 
which things are not ordered in a linear model of historical time but as a 
series of multiple perspectives. These multiple perspectives make 
consensus impossible and allow only for an open-ended evolutionary 
process in which signals of the past circulate among advanced technology 
in a non-dogmatic way. Thus, in the novel, natural and artificial animals are 
presented together and can hardly be distinguished. The former are remains 
of the past which are overvalued in the present because they are almost 
extinct. The latter are the most developed constructs of technology. Such an 
on-going presence of the past within the present tends to convey a feeling 
of timelessness.
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Freed finally from temporal restraints, Deckard’s world succeeds in 
grounding high-tech with obsolete objects. The place is, thus, populated by 
the latest developments of technology and by objects which have been 
abandoned and are now in a process of deterioration. Deckard’s world 
exemplifies Jameson’s concept of pastiche, in which wearing out and waste 
stand next to high-tech. The result is a destruction of boundaries of time 
and space.
The postmodern relationship between past and present is based on 
interaction and on the interdependence of all phenomena. This interactive, 
interdependent world view is revealed in the description of the Mission 
Street Hall of Justice building:
The Mission Street Hall of Justice building, onto the roof of 
which the hovercar descended, jutted up in a series of 
baroque, ornamented spires; complicated and modern, the 
handsome structure struck Rick Deckard as attractive. (29)
There is, thus, an interaction of old architecture in the postmodern realm 
which fits Jameson’s definition of pastiche as an aesthetics of quotation. 
Such aesthetics incorporates dead styles such as the baroque and 
ornamented spires in a postmodern context. Deckard’s world draws from 
the old and the new in a non linear way as it bridges old architecture and 
technology and rejects any idea of temporal uniformity. The result is a 
transformation of historical time into a series of multiple perspectives. This 
world presents a synchronic rather than a diachronic view. Uniformity is
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rejected and gives way to a mix of styles from different historical periods.
The dominant aesthetics of decay of Deckard’s world evokes a new 
relationship between the myths of the past and the present. Following late 
capitalist’s ‘both-and’ logic, it attempts to legitimate the values of the 
present and the past by applying a new meaning to them. So, in this fake 
environment, high technology stands alongside waste producing a conduit 
between present and past. Olalquiaga remarks that modern cities,
defying a perception of the passing of time that would 
attribute decay and deteriotation to old age, ... often display a 
mixed layering of times in which the carcasses of twenty-and- 
thirty-year-old structures stand alongside buildings that have 
aged over centuries. (30)
In Deckard’s world, this layering of times is displayed in hovercars in the 
middle of a city in ruins or in the most valuable thing one may have, that is, 
genuine animals that compete with artificial animals. While hovercars and 
electric animals represent the present, genuine animals are symbols of the 
past.
Another example of the postmodern logic of time which keeps the 
past alive in the present is the display of androids produced by advanced 
technology in decaying buildings. This is the case of Pris Stratton, who 
moves into Isidore’s decaying building. She is a Nexus-6 type, the most 
developed form of android, representative of the present time circulating in 
a decaying building. The result is a mixing of the aesthetics of decay with
advanced technology which foregrounds the postmodern timelessness.
The process of timelessness of a post-industrial society which discards 
things not by age marks but by abandonment results in a replacement of 
temporal coordinators for spatial coordinators. In the novel this is 
metaphorically portrayed by the various android types and also the very 
detection devices used to identify them. Both, the replicants and the scales, 
are representative of a politics of accelerated obsolescence which replaces 
time with space. In this way, things are not measured by time progression 
but by the obsessive production which results in an accumulation of unused 
objects.
2.8. Hyperspace
The obsessive production implies an expansion of spatial frontiers 
sensed both in outer and inner spaces. The former is represented by the 
endless accumulation of waste as a result of the rapid production of objects, 
whereas the latter is represented by a conceptual space sensed in the 
physical confusion between the human and the technological bodies.
At times the accumulation of waste renders borders between people 
and places useless. People and things get lost in the waste and fuse into one 
another. As Olalquiaga writes, this fusion can be compared to a 
psychological phenomenon called psychastenia, in which “being and
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surrounds fuse into one.”(31) In Do Androids Dream o f  Electric Sheep? 
the description of Hannibal Sloat illustrates this point:
Too old to emigrate, Hannibal Sloat, although not a special, 
was doomed to creep out his remaining life on Earth. The 
dust, over the years, had eroded him; it had left his features 
grey, his thoughts grey; it had shrunk him and made his legs 
spindly and his gait unsteady. He saw the world through 
glasses literally dense with dust. For some reason Sloat never 
cleaned his glasses. It was as if he had given up; he had 
accepted the radio-active dirt and it had begun its job, long 
ago, of burying him. Already it obscured his sight. In the few 
years he had remaining it would corrupt his other senses until 
at last only his bird-speech voice would remain, and then that 
would expire, too. (32)
Sloat incorporates dust in his own body and wears out like buildings. In this 
way, there is a break of boundaries between his body and the dust with the 
consequent abandonment of an organism and the formation of another one. 
Therefore, Sloat is unable to locate himself in the space where he is 
because his self is progressively fragmented and dissolved. When the 
knowledge of the self is not achieved and a confusion takes place between 
the realms of bodies and dust, the concept of space calls for a redefinition.
Similarly, the physical confusion between the human body and the 
technological one and the consequent exchange of identities produce a 
fragmentation of the self because one never knows what is properly the 
realm of humans and the realm of technology. As Bukatman puts it,
What is at stake in science fiction is no longer the fusion of 
beings and the immortality of the soul, but the fusion of
being and electronic technology in a new, hard-wired 
subjectivity. (33)
The Nexus-6 androids, part human, part machine, can hardly be identified 
because they possess almost all the range of human features. These 
androids are machines inside human bodies, that is, biologically they are 
pure technology but physically they look like human beings made of 
organic material. Deckard articulates this issue when he addresses Rachael: 
“Biologically. You’re not made out of transistorized circuits like a false 
animal; you’re an organic entity.”(34) In this technological era, Rachael 
embodies the image of the cybernetic organism, “a figure of indeterminate 
interface. ”(35)
The body, which used to be “the last refuge of identity’Yid,), becomes 
a site of multiple discourses:
The dissolution of boundaries, the “end of borders and 
frontiers”. . . , the waning of affect, the erosion of meaning and 
representation, the rise of spectacle and simulacra, and the 
demise of history—all of these familiar tropes are played out 
upon the physical manifestation of the subject—the body.
(37)
The dilemma of the individual is to construct a coherent self out of all these 
discourses which reproduce fragmented experiences.
When the concept of self as an organized core vanishes, the individual 
experiences a behavioral disruption. In the novel, androids reproduce this
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disruption regarding emotional experiences,
‘Roy Baty is as crazy as I am,’Pris said.
‘Our trip was between a mental hospital on the East Coast 
and here. We’re all schizophrenic, with defective emotional 
lives—flattening of affect, it’s called. And we have group 
hallucinations.’ (38)
Flattening of affect is considered to be the only source of evidence to 
identify androids. It is measured by means of the Voigt-Kampff scale which 
is “applied to a carefully selected group of schizoid and schizophrenic 
human patients. Those, specifically, which reveal what’s called a 
“flattening of affect.” (39)
2,9. The Waning of Affect
The flattening of affect portrayed in the novel may be compared to a 
condition Jameson identifies as the “waning of affect.” Jameson states that,
As for expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in 
contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centred 
subject may also mean, not merely a liberation from anxiety, 
but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since 
there is no longer a self present to do the feeling. This is not 
to say that the cultural products of the postmodern era are 
utterly devoid of feeling, but rather that such feelings—which 
it may be better and more accurate to call ‘intensities’—are 
now free-floating and impersonal. (40)
In postmodern society, the individual’s sensibility has been changed as 
feelings are not sensed directly but by high-tech simulacra or media 
imagery. Accordingly, the individual experiences emotions in an imaginary
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way where there is no real contact. As Olalquiaga puts it,
The new sense of time and space generated by 
telecommunications—in the substitution of continuity and 
distance with instantaneousness and ubiquity—has 
transformed the perception of things so that they are no 
longer lived directly but through their representations. (41)
Characterized by absence and alienation, this condition requires a “cultural 
overdose of intense emotions.”(42) Real contact is thus replaced by 
recurrent media imagery or high-tech simulacra which provides intense 
emotional experiences.
In the novel, humans also experience this condition of alienation for 
they “are so out of touch with their emotions that they must resort to 
machines in order to feel anything at all.’Y43) Accordingly, humans dial 
numbers to be affected with artificial feelings:
‘At that moment,’ Iran said, ‘when I had the TV sound off, I 
was in a 382 mood; I had just dialled it. So although I heard 
the emptiness intelectually, I didn’t feel it. My first reaction 
consisted of being grateful that we could afford a Penfield 
mood organ. But then I realized how unhealthy it was, sensing 
the absence of life, not just in this building but everywhere, 
and not reacting—do you see? I guess you don’t. But that 
used to be considered a sign of mental illness; they called it 
“absence of appropriate affect. ”(44,)
Humans are unable to feel, just like androids. Feelings have to be produced 
artificially. Humans are thus encouraged to make use of the empathy box.
The empathy box is described by Isidore as “the . most personal
possession you have! It’s an extension of your body; its the way you touch 
other humans, it”s the way you stop being alone.”(45) Accordingly, the box 
appears as an element of (pseudo)social interaction. It attempts to connect 
the individual and society by means of artificial contact. The box suggests 
that individuals are out of touch with real, lived experience.
Deckard’s world is a site of everything that is alienating: the empathy 
box, the television sets, and Mercerism, namely the state religion. All these 
elements produce individuals with similar personal experiences. No 
individuality remains. Hence, humans and androids share another common 
point. Their feelings and individuality are completely manipulated as they 
are produced artificially. However, they experience this common point in 
different ways, the former by making use of empathy boxes, television sets, 
and by following Mercerism, namely the state religion, the latter by having 
false memory implants controlled by the Rosen Association. Both the box 
and the television set reinforce what Jameson identifies as the waning of 
affect, in which individuals have no personal contact.
In Deckard’s world, television is all around even in decaying 
buildings. This characterizes Jameson’s logic of the simulacrum with its 
lived experience transformed into television images. In other words, life in 
this late capitalist society can be better grasped when it is contained within 
images or high-tech simulacra like television sets and empathy boxes. Such 
devices are produced by the social structure and transform reality into
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simulated images. This language alters the individual’s relationship to 
reality and to simulacra for they are ideologically controlled. As Bukatman 
puts it,
Images and their promise of the satisfaction of desire are 
manipulated and controlled. The consumer of images 
becomes a consumer of commodities as the subject becomes 
further colonized by the forces of capital. The coherence of 
the subject is revealed as illusory, indeed, imagistic. Control 
over these images is elusive; in fact, impossible. (46)
Within this process, the individual and reality are delineated by a mass 
culture highly oriented by the media, which reaffirm values like religion 
and a consumer lifestyle. Everything in Deckard’s late capitalist society is 
produced and controlled by the state ideology, which centered discourse on 
the old values of the past. In this way, the most valuable thing one 
identifies in such a world are natural animals, the possession of which 
measures an individual’s wealth and gives him status as they are nearly 
eradicated from Earth.
In this simulated world, images replace reality and place the 
individual into an unreal world of simulacra where they try to reaffirm the 
old values of society. Mercerism, the state religion which ends up being a 
fake, is the main example of these values:
‘I am a fraud,’Mercer said. ‘They’re sincere; their research is 
genuine. From their standpoint I am an elderly retired bit 
player named A1 Jarry. All of it, their discourse, is true.’ (47)
Wilbur Mercer as well as Buster Friendly, the entertainer who presents 
radio and television unending shows, have a huge influence on people’s 
lives. The former controls people’s minds by means of the empathy box 
which helps people fuse with Mercer and find transcendence. The latter 
presents radio and television shows which “continue twenty-three unbroken 
warm hours a day.’Y48)
Both the box and Buster’s endless television show are postmodern 
versions of the media power which exert total control of the individual. 
Bukatman states that,
The media are the extensions of the state at the expense of 
the power of the citizen. For most of the population, then, the 
new information technologies represent intrusions rather than 
extrusions. (49)
This discourse reinforces the idea of a social structure dominated by media 
imagery. In the novel, both Mercer and Friendly fight to control people’s 
minds:
Maybe Buster is jealous, Isidore conjectured. Sure, that would 
explain it; he and Wilbur Mercer are in competition. But for 
what?
Our minds, Isidore decided. They’re fighting for control of 
our psychic selves; the empathy box on one hand, Buster’s 
guffaws and off-the-cuff jibes on the other. (50)
Mercer and Friendly are symbols of a media-saturated society which gives 
legitimacy to an atmospheric artificiality. This artificiality presented in the
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novel pervades society from one’s most intimate thoughts represented by 
artificial memory implants to the state religion which controls and 
delineates one’s life. In other words, this place produces individuals devoid 
of any original thoughts whatsoever.
It is particularly clear that Deckard’s world is the site of everything 
that is alienating and alienated and both, Mercer and Friendly, stand as the 
main emblems of such features. By adopting such devices constructed for 
the production of alienation, Deckard ends up in a state of despair. Near the 
end of the novel he experiences the most profound dilemma of his life, that 
is, the doubt about the legitimacy of Mercer and, consequently, the doubt 
about the legitimacy of his reality and his own identity. “Mercer isn’t a 
fake,’he said. Unless reality is a fake.”(51) To doubt Mercer is to doubt his 
own existence and thus to lose any dimension of truth and reality.
Deckard illustrates the very concept of the postmodern world where 
appearances count as reality and simulacra is all around undermining any 
unified concept of truth and reality. In such realm where the concept of 
truth is lost, Deckard senses the fragility of his own identity as he can not 
achieve understanding of his fragmentary reality, that is, he can not see 
beyond the simulated world that he lives in. He, like the androids, ends up 
trapped in his own (un-)reality.
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CHAPTER II
Scott’s Blade Runner and the Logics 
of Late Capitalism
Early in the 21st century the Tyrell Corporation advanced 
Robot Evolution into the Nexus phase—a being virtually 
identical to human being known as REPLICANT.
The Nexus-6 replicants were superior in strength and agility 
and at least equal in intelligence to the genetic engineers who 
created them.
Replicants were used Off-world as slave labor, in the 
hazardous exploration and colonization of other planets.
After a bloody mutiny by a Nexus-6 combat team in an Off- 
world colony, replicants were declared illegal on Earth - 
under penalty of death.
Special police squads - Blade Runner Units - had orders to 
shoot or kill, upon detection, any trespassing Replicant.
This was not called execution.
It was called retirement.
Los Angeles - November 2019. (I)
This is the beginning of Ridley Scott’s 1982 film, Blade Runner, which 
places the audience into the postindustrial, technologised society of Los 
Angeles, in the year 2019. Ruled by what Jameson called the logic of late 
capitalism, the city is totally controlled by the Tyrell Corporation. The 
main purpose of the Corporation is the production of artificial “human 
beings” that can hardly be distinguished from their human counterparts.
Blade runners, namely bounty hunters, try to identify artificial beings by 
finding out if memories are implanted. In this way, the quest for memories 
ends up being the quest for one’s identity.
Paradoxically, such existential problem proves to be a common trait 
between natural and artificial beings. Both experience the void of 
subjecthood as none of their features are really theirs. Their social, 
economic, cultural and even their most intimate lives are controlled and 
manipulated under the law of multinational capitalism. Because of this high 
control over the individual’s life, natural and artificial beings are constantly 
trying to assure their status by raising questions of origin.
My discussion of Blade Runner moves between Jameson’s view of a 
multinational capitalist society, where even one’s thoughts are controlled, 
to Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum which surpasses representation 
and reproduction and produces a hyperreality. The starting point for this 
chapter is, thus, to demonstrate how Scott’s film challenges the established 
concept of the individual by raising the very problem of distinguishing 
between the human and the simulacra in the postmodern context. 
Accordingly, the main source of evidence for the identification of humans 
and replicants in the film involves questions of identity and memory, as 
human memories become the symbol of authentic humanity.
Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner has become a hallmark of postmodernist
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cultural production. Aesthetically the film labors to reconstruct the most 
representative features of a postmodernist society. The first shot of the film 
shows a futuristic city, namely Los Angeles, where a constant downpour of 
acid rain falls. The scene is accompanied by Vangelis’s music score. Both 
visual and sound effects help create a pessimistic atmosphere of a future 
world which recycles the 1940’s film noir style. This is a nostalgic pastiche 
where the old and the new keep showing through. To sum up, Scott’s Los 
Angeles is a world of simulacra where science and technology end up 
defining reality.
The city portrayed in the film is an allegory of the postmodern, 
postindustrial society. The place evokes the restructuring of social 
relationships and living patterns as a consequence of the new reality 
provided by technology. This new reality is best represented by the Nexus-6 
replicant group, perfect copies of human beings genetically engineered by 
the Tyrell Corporation. Human beings, in turn, are threatened by these 
“human” machines:
As in legendary Atlantis, the underwater city whose 
perfection led to self destruction, human beings in Blade 
Runner have technologically replicated themselves to such an 
exact degree that their own existence is now endangered. (2)
Indeed, the Nexus-6 replicant type is not only identical with human beings. 
The replicants are, as their creator Eldon Tyrell claims, “more humans than 
human beings.” In other words, they have surpassed their originals and,
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thus, have embodied Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal.
As the story unfolds, skilled blade runner Rick Deckard is informed 
that six representatives of the Nexus-6 generation, three males and three 
females, have escaped illegally to Earth. They are identified as: Leon 
Kowalsky, Roy Batty (probably the leader), Pris, Zhora, Rachael and 
another replicant whose name is omitted as he was killed earlier in an 
attempt to invade Eldon TyrelPs corporation. All the replicants, except 
Rachael, have escaped to Earth to demand a longer life from Tyrell, as they 
are created to last for only four years. Rachael differs from the group in that 
she has no termination day. This makes her a perfect simulation, since 
human beings also lack a specifically defined termination day.
Because they bear much resemblance with human beings, replicants 
have redrawn boundaries between natural and artificial beings and have 
challenged the value of originality. They thus articulate Baudrillard’s 
notion of the simulacrum, a notion that radically alters the traditional 
concept of humanity until it can no longer be called such. As a replacement 
for humans, replicants transcend their originals and embody the very 
definition of the hyperreal, namely a “generation by models of a real 
without origin or reality.”(3,) One of the steps to understand this notion of 
hyperreality is to characterize it as dimensions in which boundaries 
between reality and simulacra blur. As a result, humanity must be 
redefined.
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In Scott’s simulated Los Angeles, nothing seems to have any reality 
whatsoever, not even human beings, as they differ from replicants only in 
terms of the signifiers they can attach to themselves. This aspect renders 
human existence completely unstable as the individual who is born under 
humanist assumptions experience the void of subjecthood, just like the 
replicants. This is the case of Deckard, whose task is to put replicants into 
retirement so as to restore order and rid the society of renegade replicants. 
In the search for the remaining replicants of the Nexus-6 group, Deckard 
experiences the undermining of his own identity as the replicants’ features 
prove to be his own. Thus, he himself is from the very beginning implicated 
in a quest for his own threatened identity. For all that, Deckard becomes a 
representative of the postmodern individual who experiences the 
fragmentation of the self and can hardly achieve understanding of the 
reality he lives in.
In a closer look at Blade Runner’s main protagonist, one can find 
clear similarities between Deckard and the replicants. These similarities 
foreground the postmodern rupture between man and machine. The 
difference between natural and artificial beings has faded away and the 
postmodern individual becomes the perfect example of simulacra. In the 
film, the first events which highlight this aspect are related to photography 
and memory. Photographs are memories that may alter one’s relation to the 
present and the future, and in Deckard’s world they become a certificate of
origin, the proof of a previous existence, that which replicants do not have.
By means of photographs, replicants try to rebuild their world, to 
restore from fragments their history so that the past and the present can be 
symbolically reconstructed. So, when replicants connect past and present 
they find the narrative thread that supports their own identity. In this way, 
replicants rely desperately on photographs so as to prove their existence 
over time. This can be clearly illustrated in the shot which shows Roy and 
Leon standing outside Leon’s apartment. Roy asks ironically: “Did you get 
your precious photos?” For Leon the photos grant him a symbolic identity, 
that which allow him to enter the human discourse and to remain alive.(4)
However, the metaphor of the photographs as documents that prove 
one to be a human being is questioned when one sees that Leon’s 
photographs as well as Rachael’s might well be false. Their history is 
forged and their features are the result of their creator’s mind, Tyrell. Such 
issue illustrates the very logic of a late capitalist society which controls 
every feature of an individual’s life, even his most intimate memories, so 
that the individual himself can not achieve understanding of his own 
identity. In what follows, I consider some relevant moments in the film 
when photograph and memory threaten one’s personal identity.
The first moment happens when Deckard goes after the first replicant, 
Leon Kowalsky. The scene shows Deckard in Leon’s apartment trying to
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find some evidence about Leon’s artificial status. When Deckard comes 
across some pictures in a drawer he astonishedly asks himself: “Family 
photos? Replicants did not have family, either.” From this moment on, 
photographs become another unreliable element in order to identify human 
beings. Deckard becomes increasingly suspicious of evidences for one’s 
historical identity, such as photos. He thus experiences the postmodern 
anxiety of the individual that can not find an anchor, an organized core to 
base his personal history. In Deckard’s world photographs become, thus, 
destituted of meaning as they are registers of a reality which may not be 
true.
Another moment when photography plays a major role happens in 
Deckard’s apartment. After leaving Leon’s apartment, Deckard goes home 
and there he meets Rachael. She has brought a photograph of her mother, 
namely a document which recaptures a memory of her history. The 
photograph represents to her the trace of an origin, a certificate of a past 
life, that time which replicants do not possess. For Rachael, the 
photography is the only means by which she can try to prove she is not a 
copy of her master, Tyrell, but a human being. When Rachael shows 
Deckard the photograph and claims that she is not a replicant, he replies 
that her memories are all false.
Deckard’s argument is that the photograph belonged to Tyrell’s niece 
and that Rachael’s memories are implanted from her. Shocked by this
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revelation, Rachael’s eyes are filled with tears as she realizes she is a 
replicant unaware of her own status. She loses the connection she imagined 
she had with her original self and the sense of who she is. She experiences, 
thus, the void of subjecthood. This is a process in which the individual 
lacks the sense of his own identity because he can not project a coherent 
picture of himself as an integrated self. In other words, the individual who 
can not establish a contact with his inner self projects a fragmented image 
of his condition, an image that symbolically portrays the lack of harmony 
between the individual and the universe. Ironically, when Deckard notices 
that Rachael cries over her artificial status he himself expresses some 
empathy towards her. Deckard apologizes and says he is wrong, that is, he 
shows some concern towards a replicant. Deckard is thus confused about 
his own identity in confrontation with the Nexus-6 replicants. This aspect 
can be highlighted when Deckard claims, just after Rachael leaves his 
apartment: “Replicants were not supposed to have feelings, neither blade 
runners. What the hell is happening to me?”. Right at this moment Deckard 
looks at Leon’s and Rachael’s photos. There is, thus, a clear implication 
that the frontiers that divided their worlds are vanishing.
. Deckard’s ambivalent feelings in his relationship with replicants 
suggest that in fact Deckard does not know his real identity. This loss of 
identity is caused by the limitations existing in a postindustrial, 
technologized society in which technological developments exceed the
human capacity to keep pace with them. The greatest difficulty of the 
individual who lives in such society is, thus, to have an account of his own 
condition since he can not achieve a complete understanding of the world 
around. The individual’s condition ends up being one of alienation to what 
he and the others are. In Blade Runner, Deckard remains the main example 
of such individual.
The film presents two moments when photographs become an 
important source of evidence to redefine one’s condition. In both cases the 
setting is Deckard’s apartment. The first shot shows Deckard alone playing 
the piano. Then, while one hears the music, the camera shows several 
family pictures over the piano. Among these pictures one can identify 
Deckard’s pictures mixed with Leon’s and Rachael’s. Doubtless, such 
parallelism serves the purpose of destroying any opposition between 
Deckard and the replicants. In the process of self awareness, Deckard 
establishes meaningful ties with the world of replicants, as he can not 
assert his own separate identity in relation to them.
The key moment in the film in which such link is most clearly seen is 
the scene which shows Rachael in Deckard’s apartment for the second time. 
Rachael and Deckard share the same feeling, that is, both are shaking 
because Rachael has just shot Leon when he is about to kill Deckard. 
Finally, right after this scene, there is a sequence of shots which shows 
Rachael looking at the pictures over the piano and then at Deckard
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sleeping. After that, Rachael goes near the piano, takes a closer look at the 
pictures and then plays it. Photograph and music help her recapture a 
memory, a past moment.
While Rachael is playing the piano, Deckard comes to her. Visually, 
the scene provides a direct parallelism between Deckard and Rachael so 
that one can not distinguish between the human and the simulacrum. Such a 
combination of parallels puts Deckard in the same position as Rachael, a 
replicant, and foregrounds the postmodern world where appearances, which 
are counted as reality, are so commodified that real identity behind 
simulacra becomes inconceivable. The postmodern individual is defined, 
thus, according to his surface reflection without any depth (Fig. 1).
As the story goes on, Deckard and the replicants become more and 
more alike (Fig. 2). The conventional features that distinguished them 
gradually disappear and the artificial being has access to human discourse. 
The issue may be illustrated by Rachael, whose emotional feelings places 
her near Deckard, and also by Deckard’s reaction towards Zhora’s death. 
He feels sick about shooting her and wonders about her death report:
The report would be routine retirement of a replicant which
didn’t make me feel any better about shooting a woman in the
back.
There it was again.
Feeling for her, for Rachael.
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The dialogue shows that Deckard has accepted these artificial beings under 
humanist assumptions and that he expresses deep empathy with them. In 
Deckard’s mind, the machine has vanished under the surface reflection of 
replicants which portrays human features.
Due to the technological developments that permeate Deckard’s 
world, the individual witnesses transformations which place him in a world 
of uncertainty. As a result, replicants and human beings share feelings of 
anxiety and doubt. When the policeman Gaff says to Deckard: “It’s too bad 
she won’t live but then again, who does?”, the opposition between 
replicants and human beings vanishes as both are victimized by the power 
of a late capitalist society which manipulates one’s features to the point 
that no individuality remains. People, like machines, are programmed and 
commodified to such a degree that they can not see beyond their world. 
This is a world reduced to an image and the postmodern individual is 
defined according to its surface reflections. Deckard and Rachael remain as 
examples of this postmodern individual who can not hold a determinate 
identity because they are “commodified and transformed into their own 
images. n(5)
Living under the cultural logic of the simulacrum, the postmodern 
individual hardly succeeds in finding an identity as he lacks an anchoring 
point in reality. In such a depthless reality, as Jameson puts it, only images
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unsupported by reality are communicated. In Blade Runner, replicants may 
be taken as examples of such depthlessness, as their images do not reveal 
their real identity. Rachael, for instance, is not in fact Tyrell’s niece but a 
replicant who has replaced his real niece. Rachael is the perfect example of 
the postmodern individual who is reduced to a commodified, depthless 
image. This issue foregrounds technology as a power that
can alter reality and produce nonexistent identities or switch 
existing ones even deleting people from the annals of the 
living and resurrecting the dead. (6)
As a result, the only way to find one’s real identity is searching endlessly 
for one’s origin, namely, one’s anchor point in reality. Ultimately, Blade 
Runner deals with the related questions of origin, maternity and 
temporality to identify natural human beings.
In the film, photographs juxtapose fragments of memory and 
maternity to illustrate the question of origin and temporality. The figure of 
the mother represents the chain which links past, present and future and 
provides a sense of continuity throughout time. Both, photograph and 
mother, precede the present moment and are representative of one’s history. 
As Giuliana Bruno writes,
as a document of ‘that has been’, photography constitutes a 
document of history, of its deferred existence ... History is 
that time when my mother was alive before me. It is the trace 
of the dream of unity, of its impossibility. (7)
69
Photograph and mother incorporate elements on a symbolic level. Photos 
enable the individual to recover some moments of those years which are 
gone, whereas the mother helps the individual to establish a historical 
narrative which supports one’s identity. When one searches for the mother, 
one tries to reach a time before oneself so that one can have an imaginative 
version of oneself. Metaphorically, the mother is a manifestation of a 
primordial self, a chain which establishes ties between the individual and 
his selfhood.
In Blade Runner, Leon, Rachael, and Deckard are examples of the 
postmodern individual who strives to keep his selfhood by means of his link 
with the mother. When Leon undergoes a test at the Tyrell Corporation to 
identify his status and is asked to talk about his mother, he says: “My 
mother? I’ll tell you about my mother!” Suddenly Leon stands up and 
shoots the inquirer. Leon can not talk about his mother because she 
incorporates direct references to a false heritage. Actually, he has no real 
family ties and no evidence that he has a past leading to a present.
By the same token, Rachael shows Deckard a photograph of a mother 
and a daughter claiming to be hers: “Look, this is me with my mother!” 
Rachael’s photograph of her mother is an element which reveals the 
ambivalence of her condition. It remains as an encoded subtext within the 
postmodern world as it is allusive of a reality which does not exist. 
Rachael’s search for a maternal history represents then her search for the
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original self, for that place within discourse where the referent names 
something real, that is, the real version of him/herself. Simbolically, she 
touches and reconstructs an old, original self, a history which can establish 
her identity over time.
Deckard uses the photographs of his mother to restore fragments of 
memory and history so as to define himself. The mother is a memory of a 
primeval reality, a manifestation of a narrative model which represents 
truth and reality, a possibility of experiencing the dimensions of past and 
future. Entailed in the reliance of having a mother, Deckard affirms his 
status as a natural being. Ironically, this aspect is undermined throughout 
the story because the mothers are portrayed only by means of photographs 
which, as pointed out before, have become unreliable evidence. In 
Deckard’s world, photography becomes unreliable memory. Thus a crucial 
element in the formation of a self turns out to be a false feature artificially 
fabricated.
Memories have a heightened significance for the postmodern 
individual: they are images of previous moments retained in the mind. 
Memory registers impressions, stores information, reorders it, and 
establishes meaningful ties between items so that one can make sense of 
one’s own world. When Rachael goes to Deckard’s apartment for the 
second time, she plays the piano to recapture a memory, a moment of 
history which is omitted in her mind. Although Rachael claims that she did
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not know she could play the piano, her false memory implants enable her to 
sort out what she thinks are her emotions, but which are actually Tyrell’s 
niece’s emotions. Fabricated memories are thus a crucial element in the 
replicants’ lives, as they help replicants to bridge the gap between past and 
present and provoke “human” emotional responses.
Deckard touches the very issue of memory in the scene in which he 
analyzes Leon’s and Rachael’s pictures. He wonders: “I don’t know why 
replicants would collect photos. Maybe they were like Rachael, they needed 
memories.” Paradoxically, memories are also important for Deckard. As he 
makes a description about himself he says that he is an ‘ex-cop, ex-blade 
runner, ex-killer’ and he even mentions his ‘ex-wife’. In other words, 
Deckard does not have a present identity, he is only a reflection of a past 
life. Living under the cultural logic of late capitalism, Deckard keeps the 
past alive by attempting to join his present image with his referent in the 
past, just like replicants. His present moment only makes sense in terms of 
the past which is kept alive by means of photographs and memories.
Needless to say, in Deckard’s postmodern world photographs and 
memories become unreliable elements in the specification of an identity as 
both can be fabricated: photos are commodities and memories are “parts” of 
a machine. In this manner, Deckard’s world becomes a metaphor of a late 
capitalist society which controls every feature of an individual so that he 
can hardly establish boundaries between reality and simulacra. The
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individual who lives in such a simulated world can not grasp the unreality 
of his own life because the information that circulates all around can be 
commodified to such an extent that his own self is reduced to a 
discontinuous series of representations. In Baudrillard’s account, this 
individual is nothing but a simulacrum.
The task of the postmodern individual is to search for his origins, that 
is, to find a historical link so as to guarantee his status. In Blade Runner 
the replicants’ search for the father also becomes a metaphor for the search 
for origins since the father is a source in the production of a self. Because 
replicants can not find the father, they have no established sense of 
selfhood, so they can not avoid the feeling of emptiness that their condition 
involves. This aspect can be illustrated by the female replicant, Pris. While 
in Sebastian’s apartment she claims: “I think, therefore, I am.” At the core 
of the philosophical implications of this assertion stands a replicant who 
tries unsuccessfully to confirm her existence as a subject. Pris becomes a 
representative of the postmodern individual who experiences the void of 
subjecthood because all her memories and fantasies are implanted. Pris’s 
assertion foregrounds the need to find an identity to herself as she, like the 
other replicants, is still enslaved to her maker. Pris wants to find her maker 
in order to be free of the links which tie them and also to assure her 
temporality.
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cFor the same reason, the other replicants go after Tyrell, the “father” 
who gave life to them. They want to demand a longer lifetime as they are 
programmed to live for only four years. In addition to the direct references 
of Tyrell as maker and father of replicants, the film also offers an allusive 
reading of Tyrell as the one who embodies late capitalism’s power to 
control people’s lives not only in social discourse but also at the level of 
the discourse of the self. As Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner state,
Blade Runner ... calls attention to the oppressive core of 
capitalism and advocates revolt against exploitation. The 
Tyrell corporation invents replicants in order to have a more 
pliable labour force, and the film depicts how capitalism 
turns humans into machines. (8)
In late capitalist society, boundaries between human and technological 
values are cancelled. This is metaphorically portrayed in the film by the 
relationship between Deckard and the replicants. While in Tyrell 
corporation, Deckard says to Rachael: “Replicants are like any other 
machine. They can be a benefit or a hazard.” Paradoxically, Deckard falls 
in love with Rachael, a replicant.
The film also illustrates late capitalism’s control in the scene which 
follows Rachael’s test. The shot shows Deckard asking Tyrell about 
Rachael:
Deckard: ‘How can it not know what it is?’
Tyrell: ‘Commerce.’
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In a society of total controls, even the individual ends up molded into a 
powerful consumer machine. As Rachael tells Deckard, “I’m not in the 
business. I’m the business.” Rachael’s words reinforce the economic 
formation of late capitalism which classifies everything according to the 
logic of utility and prestige value. The individual becomes a commodity 
trapped in a new emergent social and economic order.
Moreover, Tyrell’s power is portrayed even geographically, as the 
Tyrell Corporation pyramid, namely the place where Tyrell makes his 
genetic experiments and also his own home, dominates the city.- Tyrell is 
the master who exerts control over the replicants’ own sense of identity: he 
is the patriarch who creates replicants and programs every feature of their 
lives. In this way, Tyrell grants replicants not only a symbolic identity but 
also an imaginary one, that is, a self with all its values previously defined, 
including their lifespan.
Being totally determined and yet powerfully “human”, replicants end 
up in a state of despair both because they can not have a sense of the 
individual self and also because of their short temporality. The result is a 
confrontation with Tyrell and a cry for more life. A sequence of shots 
shows J. F. Sebastian and Roy in Tyrell’s building:
Tyrell: ‘What? What is the problem?’
Roy: ‘Death.’
Tryell: ‘I’m afraid it’s out of my control.’
Roy: ‘I want more life.’
75
Replicants are representative of the postmodern individual with his 
fragmented temporality. This condition denies a past and seals off any hope 
of a future life placing the individual in a constant present.
Deprived of the dimension between past and present, replicants 
remain as examples of the schizophrenic individual with his fragmented 
temporality. The schizophrenic individual is constantly threatened in his 
self identity because his chronology is disrupted. Again, this condition is 
characteristic of the postmodern moment. As a result of his feeling of 
fragmentation, the schizophrenic individual can not grow, can hardly have 
an existence over time. As Jameson states, the schizophrenic is reduced to 
“a series of pure and unrelated presents in time.” (9) In other words, the 
schizophrenic can not make a connection between his present time and the 
various moments of his past. In this way, he has no conceivable future 
because he ends up living in a circular reference, trapped by his own 
temporal breakdown.
In Blade Runner, replicants articulate this fragmented temporality in 
their condition of beings with a lifespan of four years. In other words, 
replicants can not have a sense of continuity with the past and consequently 
they question their future. This issue can be illustrated almost in the end of 
the film when Roy has just died. Deckard wonders about what Roy wanted 
to know:
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‘Where do I come from?
Where am I going?
How long have I got?
All the questions all of us ask.’
Thus, the most profound dilemmas of replicants, namely the search for their 
temporality, is a common trait of human beings, too.
Still, the dominant idea of individuals who have their lifetime already 
determined portrays the total control that a late capitalist society has over 
the individual as it determines even the time to be born and the time to die. 
“Time to die”, says Roy in the final scene of his battle with Deckard. Roy, 
like the other replicants, is doomed to live a life programmed by a superior 
entity. In other words, late capitalist society organizes not only the public 
issues that define the individual’s life but also the private ones. The logic 
which permeates such society turns everything into a commodity, from 
one’s lifespan to one’s own values, as it organizes one’s work, family and 
sexuality.
Nonetheless, late capitalist society articulates a set of patterns which 
value life and its intense emotional experiences. In Deckard’s world, 
replicants portray such aspect as, despite their short lifespan, their life is 
lived very intensely. This issue can be best exemplified by the male 
replicant, Roy Batty. When Roy meets Tyrell in his home and complains 
that replicants were not created to last long, Tyrell compares Roy to a light 
that burns faster but brighter. Furthermore, in the battle scene with
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Deckard, Roy says melancholically: “I’ve seen things you people wouldn’t 
believe.” In other words, despite the short lifespan, replicants experience 
life with much more intensity than humans who live longer. Hence, in their 
urgent and intense life, replicants end up making their existence much more 
meaningful in precisely “human” terms.
One of the moments in the film which illustrates this aspect is again 
related to the battle scene between Roy and Deckard. When Roy has won 
the fight and Deckard is almost falling from the building, the replicant 
holds Deckard’s hand and saves his life. Roy is aware of the brevity of his 
existence but he wants more life. Metaphorically, Deckard means life to 
Roy. Thus, in this moment, replicant and bounty hunter share a feeling of 
fragility. Deckard depended on Roy to continue living and Roy relied on 
Deckard in order to carry feelings of continuity into the future. Some 
moments later, Deckard experiences again the dimensions of his own life 
and the feeling of fragility that his society imposes on the individual. The 
last sequence in the film shows Deckard flying away with Rachael. He 
claims: “I don’t know how long we have together. Who does?” In late 
capitalist society, the future is controlled and undermined by a superior 
power which turns the subject into an object to be manipulated. The 
individual is, thus, constantly placed in a world of uncertainty.
The question of fragmented temporality is also exemplified in J.F. 
Sebastian. He is twenty five years old but suffers from cellular decrepitude,
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that is, he is ageing prematurely. There is, thus, a clear identification 
between replicants and Sebastian as they share a common trait, both have a 
short lifespan. Ironically, as the story unfolds, Pris and Roy realize that 
Sebastian is a member of Tyrell’s team, the one who designed replicants. 
Sebastian becomes a link between replicants and Tyrell and later takes Roy 
to TyrelPs building to meet his creator.
Sebastian’s internal process of time duration becomes a metaphor of 
the postindustrial condition of wearing out which creates an aesthetics of 
decay. The timeless Bradbury building where Sebastian lives is 
representative of this aesthetic, since one finds garbage all around. 
Actually, all the city of Los Angeles created by Scott exposes the dark side 
of technology and its consequence in the environment and in the 
individual’s life. What is ultimately being revealed is the precarious 
condition of the human being’s identification with the world around and the 
disturbing image of his own self:
Human beings in this film are in a state of spiritual decay 
metaphorically portrayed in the condition they’ve brought 
upon Earth, a planet so unhealthy it must be abandoned for 
better (however artificial) colonies. (10)
In other words, the film juxtaposes the individual’s and the city’s decaying 
process. This process transforms everything into transient things which do 
not last long and leave no seeds to take root. This issue is metaphorically 
portrayed by Roy when he says to Deckard, some minutes before dying, that
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the things he saw throughout his short lifespan “will be lost in time, like 
tears in the rain.” After his death, nothing will be left from him, not even 
his memories.
In postmodern Los Angeles, the aesthetics of decay is reinforced by 
the constant rain fall which provides a dark scenery throughout the film. 
The individual submerges in the rain and in the shadows of the enormous 
towers which populate the city. Night is constant, and the environment is a 
fake one devoid of any trace of nature. Environmental pollution is 
pervasive, massive advertising videoscreens covering the sides of the 
buildings or shown by flying cars. The opening scene of the film illustrates 
the negative look of this futuristic city as it combines the endless rain, the 
eletronic advertisements, the constant explosions, and the smoke which 
permeates all the atmosphere.
In this postmodern city, the peculiar urban decay portrays the 
postindustrial politics of waste and recycling. One of the examples which 
foreground such politics of recycling is the look of the female replicant, 
Pris. She is found by Sebastian in the middle of the garbage. Her visual 
look is the exact expression of the aesthetics of decay reinforced by the 
white wig, the exaggerated make up, and the costume which seems to be in 
a process of disintegration (Fig. 3). As Bruno puts it, “consumerism, waste, 
and recycling meet in fashion, the ‘wearable art’ of late capitalism, a sign 
of postmodernism.”^  Pris is labelled the ‘basic pleasure model’. For all
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Fig. 3
that , Pr is e m bod ie s  a text  which  is a l lus ive  to the pos tm odern  va lues  and  
concep t ions .
In terms  o f  a rch i tec tu re ,  the s tyle o f  Blade Runner evokes  a nos talg ic  
pas t i che  which  p roduces  a new spatial  logic.  In J a m e s o n ’s words ,  pas t i che  
is " the  imi ta t ion  o f  dead  s tyles,  speech th rough  all the  m asks  and v o ices  
s tored up in the imaginary  m u se u m  o f  a n ow  global  cu l tu re .” (12) In S c o t t ’s 
city the m ain  e x a m p les  o f  decay  are the  B ra dbu ry  bui ld ing ,  where  Sebas t ian 
lives, and  the Tyrell  Corpora t ion .  The  fo rm er  r em a ins  as f ragments  o f  the 
real  Los Ange les  Bradbury a rch i tec tu re ,  w he re as  the lat ter  evokes  
quo ta t ions  from the  past,  f rom the a rch i tec tu re  o f  the bu i ld ing  i tse lf  wh ich  
resem b les  an Egypt ian  py ram id  (Fig. 4),  to the  Greek  co lum ns  inside the 
bui lding.  C o m m e n t in g  on the co lu m ns ,  O la lq u ia g a  rem arks  that ,
their  indexical  value as signs o f  power and authori ty  has been 
t ransformed into an inter textual  one. What  mat ters  now is the 
c o lum ns ’ vague allusion to a history that has become a still 
scenario where eras, locat ions,  and characters  figure merely 
as props. (13)
Such re la t ionsh ip  b e tw e en  past  and p resen t  is based  on in te rac t ion  and  not 
on reject ion.  Therefo re ,  his tory does  not  m ean  any p rogress  but  it is 
t ran s fo rm ed  into a ser ies  o f  m ult ip le  pe rspec t ives .  Pas t  and  present  are  
v iew e d  toge the r  and  are  r ec rea ted  to form a n e w  history.
S c o t t ’s Los Ange les  inser ts  the v iewer  in a c o m p l e x  set o f  cul tural  and  
his tor ica l  re fe rences  which  rea r ranges  t im e  and  space.  In the f ilm,
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Roman and Greek colum ns  provide a retro mise -en-scene  for 
the city. Signs o f  c lass ical  Oriental  mythology recur. Chinese 
dragons are revisited in neon lighting. A s trong Egypt ian 
element  pervades the decor. The  Tyrell  corporat ion overlooks 
what  resemble  the Egypt ian pyramids in a full sunset.  The 
interior o f  the office is not  high-tech,  but  rather  a pop 
Egypt ian extravaganza,  to which the choreography o f  
m ovem ent  and m ake  up o f  Zhora adds exotic ism.  Elevators 
might  have video screens, but  they are made  o f  stone. The 
walls o f  D ecka rd 's  apar tment  are reminiscen t  o f  an ancient  
Mayan palace. (14)
This  spat ia l  s t ruc ture ,  w h ich  is a pe rfec t  e x a m p le  o f  pas t i che,  m ix es  high 
t echno logy  with s tyl is tic quo ta t ions  from a num ber  o f  hi s to r ical  periods.  In 
this  way,  the city por trays  the  pos tm odern  pol i t ics  o f  space  w h ic h  rep laces  
t ime:
Constant ly  referr ing to a plethora o f  different t imes and 
cultures,  with buildings from all epochs anachronis t ical ly  
a ligned side by side, space becomes  an imaginary  territory 
where instead o f  a casual  organization,  a past iche o f  
seemingly r andom selections prevails.  (15)
In this  a rch i tec tu ra l  pas t iche,  the new  in teract s  w i th  the old in a synchron ic  
cons truc t ion .  The  pas t  is symbol ica l ly  r econs t ruc ted  and  va lo r ized  as  it is 
in fused  wi th  a pos i t ive  nostalgia .  And  the p resen t  m o m e n t  is the  resul t  o f  
the  in te rac t ion  b e tw e en  past  and  p resen t  as  it abso rbs  eve ry th ing  tha t  has  
c o m e  before.
Free f rom a ch ro no log ica l  s equence ,  the po s tm o d e rn  ‘b o t h -a n d ’ logic  
turns  every th ing  into a c o m m o d i ty  that  c i rcu la tes  in hyperspace .  Thus ,  the 
s ignif iers  o f  the past ,  l ike the Greek  co lu m ns ,  c i r cu la te  a m o n g  advanced
t echno log ie s ,  l ike r ep l icants ,  p l ac ing  the  individua l  in an endless  presen t  
t ime.  In other  words,  the e c o n o m ic  and  cul tural  pas t i ches  with thei r  logic  o f  
ut i l i ty  tu rns  anyth ing  from the  past  into a c o m m o d i ty  in the p resen t  t ime.  
Blade Runner, wi th  its pecu l i a r  m ix tu re  o f  the mythic  past  wi th  the 
t e c hno log ise d  future,  ce leb ra tes  J a m e s o n ’s cul tural  logic o f  the t im es  with 
the e f f a c e m e n t  o f  the bounda r ie s  b e tw e en  past,  present  and  future  and  
asser ts  a pre fe rence  for  a spatia l  na rra t ive  rather  than  a t empora l  one.
The  spatial  na rra t ive  focuses  on a n e w  concep t  o f  space  which is f ree 
f rom restrain ts ,  the cybe rspace.  In cybe rspace ,  l imit s  can hard ly  be g ra s p e d  
by the hum an  percep t ion  as spaces  are  c h a rac te r ized  by boundlessness .  
S c o t t ’s Los Ange les  is the main  e x a m p le  o f  a p lace devo id  o f  boundari es .  It 
is indeed,
a decentered  and boundless  space dispersed, thanks to the 
hovercars  and rooftop chases,  across all three dimensions  o f  
the urban topography. (16)
T h e  aesthe t i cs  o f  the city,  one  o f  spatial  loss, c rea te s  a cr is is  o f  
r ep re sen ta t ion  o f  space:
the urban territory is marked by an infinity o f  space, a 
multipl ic ity o f  surfaces: t ime  is displaced  within a field o f  
inaction and, ul timately,  inertia as the city, the universe, 
c ircles back upon i tself  in a c losed feedback loop: in the 
language o f  the s ituationists,  the city-state has become the 
cybernetic state.(17 )
In cyberne t i c  space,  the  individual  is t r a p p e d  in the  c ir cu la r  re l a t ionsh ip  o f  
images.  The  ind iv idual  can not  e scape  be c ause  there  is no way  out ,  no 
bounda r ie s  to be crossed.  The  city is o v e rc r o w d e d  and spaceless .  As  
B u ka tm a n  put s  it, “ the n e w  urban space  is d i rec t ion le s s -coo rd ina tes  are  
l i teral ly  va lue- le ss  w hen  all d i rec t ions  lead  to m ore  o f  the  s a m e .” (78,) In 
other  words ,  this  p lace  is full o f  in te rsec t ions  w h ich  lead nowhere .
The  new  logic  o f  space  can be  i l l us tr a ted  by M o e b i u s ’s and A le x a n d e r  
Jo d o r o w s k y ' s  c om ics  “ The  Inca l” , in which  the  he ro  is th row n from Suic ide  
Alley (Fig. 5). The  p icture  shows his fall into a p lace  w i thou t  l imits.  Th is  
spatia l  loop ing  revea ls  chaos  in all levels:
there  is no logic or order  to the space which  lies l ittered 
and  cluttered, a morass  o f  high and low technologies ,  a 
chaos o f  intersecting lines. The only constant  is the drop, 
which  serves  as much  to reveal the enti re urban space 
in a glance as to t ransform it into an environmen t  o f  threat 
and  spatial  dislocations.  (19)
The p ic tu re  prov ides  a ‘to ta l i z ing  g a z e ’, as  B u ka tm a n  puts it, in w h ich  one  
can grasp only the  global  space.  All t endenc ie s  tow ard  re fe ren t ia l i ty  are  
denied.
B u k a tm a n  co m p a res  the picture  f rom Suic ide  Al ley with the shot  in 
which  D ecka rd  and  G a f f  approach  pol ice  headquar te r s  (Fig. 6). He s ta tes  
that  the v i ew e r  is p resen ted  wi th  two spaces ,
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C oncentra ted  cities: The Incal by Moebius and Alexander Jodo- 
rowsky. (Marvel Comics)
Fig. 5

the first is the superbly detai led urban space which  domina tes  
the f ilm, an effect produced  by a seamless  blend o f  miniature  
vehicles ,  models  o f  varying scales, compute r  controlled 
camerawork ,  and mult iple  layers o f  t ravel ing mattes. (20)
The  seco n d  f ie ld,  as B u k a tm a n  calls  it, is “ de f ined  by the  con tro l s  and  da ta  
sc reens  o f  the  ho v e rc a r . ’Y2/y The  v i e w e r ’s pe rspec t ive  is highly rest r ic ted  
in scope.  Hovercar s  m ove  ver t i ca l ly  and  hor izon ta l ly  th rough  ways  wh ich  
un d e rm in e  any percep tua l  ev idence .  As cybe rspace  is inf ini t e  and  
boundless ,  the individual  can hardly ach ieve  any spatial  consensus.
Th is  n e w  spatial  d im e ns ion  be c o m e s  clear ly  v is ible  in some o f  the  
images  used  for  the f i lm,  such as “ The  Long T o m o r r o w ” f igure  by M o e b iu s  
and  Dan O ’B annon  (Fig. 7). The  f igure p resen ts  a place wi thou t  any central  
r e fe rence  point.  The  p o s tm ode rn  indiv idual  feels  lost in this  hype rspace  
b e c au s e  he can  not  iden t i fy  any spatial  center.  In such a d e c en te re d  
aes the t i c ,  the individua l  can only suspec t  that  there  is a global  logic  tha t  
canno t  be fully  k n o w n  and  m apped.
J a m e s o n ’s r ead ing  o f  John  P o r t m a n ' s  "B o n a v e n tu ra  H o te l” a lso 
i l lustrates  the new  urban  spat ia l i ty  (Fig. 8). As J a m e s o n  wr i tes ,  the 
“ B ona ve n tu ra  Hotel  aspires  to b e in g  a total space ,  a c o m p le te  wor ld ,  a k ind  
o f  m in ia tu re  city. 'Y22) In o ther  words ,  the B on a v e n tu ra  is not  a part  o f  the 
city,  bu t  a separa te  m ic ro co s m  which  r ep laces  the city in ali its features .  It 
is a se lf -r e fe ren t ia l  space  that  has  cu t  i t s e l f  o f f  f rom the  rest o f  the city. The  
ou te r  space,  m ade  o f  glass  skin,  p roduces  a d i s to r ted  image  o f  the  city
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C o m i c s ) .  A m a j o r  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  d e s i g n  of  Blade Runner.
Fig.  7
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outside.  As J a m e s o n  puts  it,
the glass skin achieves a peculiar  and  placeless dissociat ion 
o f  the Bonavenfura f rom its neighbourhood:  it is not  even an 
exter ior , inasmuch as when  you seek to look at the hotel ' s  
outer  walls you cannot  see the hotel itself, but  only the 
distorted images o f  everything that  surrounds it. (23)
T h e  B onaven tu ra  ce lebra tes  inner  space  as  an h o m o g e n e o u s  site in d i ff e ren t  
scala r  levels  (Fig. 9). In J a m e s o n ' s  words ,  this  is a space  o f  loss for  the 
ind ividual  m oves  a round  and  can hard ly  loca te  himself .
T h e  cyberspace  na rra t ive  i l lu strates  a concep tua l  shif t  in t e rm s  o f  
space  w h ich  evokes  an ‘ im p lo d e d '  u rbani sm.  (24) The  m ain  e x a m p le  o f  
such u rban space  is the  shopp ing  mall .  B u k a tm a n  s ta tes  that  the s hopp ing  
mall ,
possesses  a monadic  self-sufficiency in which the outside 
wor ld  is denied (the mall  has no windows and no weather ,  
while  points  o f  egress are hidden o f f  to the sides), but  this is 
coupled with a recapitulation o f  forms that  s trongly connote  
exteriority - " s t r e e t s ” are  l ined with carefully planted and 
nur tured  trees; a central  " food  court” mim ics  the piazzas and 
plazas  o f  a more t radi tional  urban space. (25)
In this  s im ula ted  city, as the inner  and  ou ter  spaces  are  inside, i l lus tra t ions  
o f  spat ia l  bounda r ie s  are di srupted.
In S c o t t ’s f ilm,  " im p lo d e d "  spatial  d i s loca t ions  can be a p p re h e n d e d  in 
two  ways: bio log ica l ly  and  geograph ica l ly .  Biologica l ly ,  by the r e p l a ce m e n t  
o f  pa r ts  o f  the body  from organ ic  to art i ficia l.  Geograph ica l ly ,  in the
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expa ns ion  o f  life into far -di s tant  planets.  In this  way,  the pos tm odern  
spatia l  f ront ier s  have ex p a n d ed  its l imits  to the  ex ten t  that  one can hardly 
loca te  o n e s e l f  in space. Rep l ican ts  i l lus trat e  very clear ly  the n e w  pe rcep t ion  
o f  space  b e tw e en  the organ ic  and the ar t i f ic ia l  bodies .  As O la lqu iaga  puts
Having turned into a classic because o f  its complex t reatment  
o f  a high-tech reality, Blade Runner  explores  the threat posed 
to the body by technological  reproduct ion and quest ions the 
assumptions  underlying this menace.  (26)
In Blade Runner, the in tegra t ion o f  t echno log ica l  parts  into the h u m a n  
body  raises  the very ques t ion  o f  de f in ing  hum anity .
Af ter  a his tory o f  m uta t ion ,  the o rgan ic  body is no longer  a source  o f  
ev idence  to ident i fy h u m an i ty  because ,  in a t echno log ica l  wor ld ,  “ ne i ther  is 
hum an e n e s s  exc lus ively  organic ,  nor  is the organic  a gua ran tee  o f  
h u m a n i ty . ” (27) With  the techno log ica l  de v e lo p m en t s  the  dua l i ty  that  
separa ted  organic  and art i f icia l  bod ies  has van ished  as the body  has b e c o m e  
ar t i f i c ia l ,  whe reas  t echno logy  has  been  taken into the h u m a n  realm.  In o ther  
words ,  hum an i ty  has  used t echnolog ica l  dev ices  in order  to ove r r e a ch  i t se l f  
and,  thus,  has c o m m o d i f i e d  i ts e lf  to such a degree  that  new bounda r ie s  
must  be drawn be tw een  the so -ca l led  natural  and  art i ficia l  individuals .
The  c o m m o d i f i c a t io n  o f  bod ies  is a lso i l lu s tra ted  in f i lms  like 
Roboeop. In this  f i lm,  the  robot  em b o d ie s  a ter r i tor ia l  s t ruggle  as he is the
resul t  o f  a “ t e c h n o - h u m a n o id  fus ion .”(2H) R o b o c o p  shows  clear ly  the 
" in t ro jec t ion ’ o f  e lec tron ic  appa ra tus  into the h u m a n  body (Fig. 10). As 
B u k a tm a n  observes ,
in the current  era o f  t echno-surreal ism similar  ambiva lences 
pertain,  and as the represented  body moves ever more  
emphat ica l ly  toward a symbiosis  with electronic  technology,  
it b ecomes  ever  more  emphat ical ly  armored. (29)
Robocop ,  l ike the r ep l ican ts  o f  Blade Runner, is a pure  e x a m p le  o f  the 
cyborg.  He  is par t  cop  and  part  m ach ine ,  and  in his search  for  social  o rder  
he p roduces  hum an  as well  as t echno log ica l  di scourses .  As B u ka tm a n  puts 
it, th is  a rm o red  body resis ts  def ini t ion.
In te rm s  o f  its ge ograph ica l  scope,  the  f i lm portrays l ife in o ther  
p lanet s  and  space  t ravels  to di s tant  places .  The  un iverse  is in a process  o f  
e xpans ion  and rep l ican ts  are used o f f-wor ld  in the  e xp lo ra t ion  o f  o ther  
planets .  Fur thermore ,  the Los Ange les  where  D e c ka rd  l ives suggest s  a 
geograph ica l  d i sp lacem en t  as it present s  or iental  f ea tu res  in an A m er ican  
po l lu ted  megalopol is .  As e x a m p les  o f  the or iental  d o m ina t ion ,  one  can 
na m e  the Japanese  girl who  appears  in the huge  a d ve r t i s em en ts  t h roughou t  
the  city and  also the or iental  m erchan t s  in the  s t reets  w h o  sell f rom food to 
ar t i f ic ia l  eyes. As Bruno  puts  it,
the city is a large market ;  an intrigue o f  underground 
networks pervades all relations. The explosive Orient  
dominates ,  the Orien t  o f  yesterday incorporat ing the Orient  o f  
today. (30)
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Moreover ,  the city is o v e rc ro w d e d  with all kinds o f  people:  punks ,  
or iental  m erchan ts ,  ha re -kr i shnas,  heavy  meta l  and  othe rs  w hose  language  
is a m ix tu re  o f  Spani sh ,  G erm an ,  J apanese ,  and Engl ish.  In other  words ,  the 
language  is a pas t iche  as wel l  as the a rch i tec tu re  o f  the  city. In one shot,  for  
exam p le ,  one can iden t i fy  d iff e rent  groups  o f  peop le ,  d i ff e ren t  cu l tu res  
sp read  a round  in neon  l igh t ing s igns,  and  a pe rvas ive  smoke ,  typical  o f  
p os tm odern  ci t ies  (Fig. 11). This  is a chaos  o f  s igns which  por tray the 
cond i t ion  o f  f r a gm en ta t ion  and a l i ena t ion  o f  the individual .  The  sense  o f  
f ragm en ta t ion  is re in fo rced  by the scene  which  shows  Z h o r a ' s  death.  As she 
is shot,  she b reaks  several  s tore  w ind o w s  which  are sp read  all around.  The  
f ragm ents  o f  the w i n d o w  glass  b e c o m e  a m e ta p h o r  for  the feel ing  o f  
f r agm en ta t ion  o f  the in d iv id u a l .(31) In this p lace  w here  ind iv idual i ty  is 
highly con tro l led,  the individual  can hard ly  m ove  because  o f  the c row ds  o f  
peop le  and  ga rbage  spread all around.  Therefo re ,  the indiv idua l  wa lks  and  
behaves  l ike a robot  c o n c e rn e d  m ore  with funct ion than  with emotion .  In 
the process  o f  de c a d e n c e  o f  the p o s tm ode rn  city, the individual  is 
t r a n s fo rm ed  into a passive  being.
S c o t t ’s a l l egory  o f  c o n s u m e r  society,  h igh l igh ted  th roughou t  the f i lm 
by the coca-co la  adve r t i s em en t ,  recreates  the p o s tm o d e rn  rea lm  with all its 
c o m m od i f i ca t ions ,  f rom o n e ’s ident i ty  to o n e ’s photographs .  The  logic  that  
pe rm e a te s  the  city po rtrays an oppress ive  dom ain  o f  cap i t a l i sm  over  every 
social  formation.  Accord ing ly ,  the individual  who  l ives in this  p lace
í I
observes the invasion of his life at all levels. Actually, even the individual’s 
own history is reconstructed to such an extent that he can not identify his 
status, either natural or artificial. The consequence is that the postmodern 
individual lives in a constant threat of non-being, trapped by his own 
creation, namely replicants. Such issue foregrounds the logic of simulation 
which undermines any concept of truth and reality in the film. Living in this 
unreal world, the individual submerges under the reality principle and then 
emerges from fragments to celebrate representation and reproduction.
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CONCLUSION
Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream o f  Electric Sheep? and 
Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner take up the theme of defining humanity 
by means of different aesthetic forms. In their printed and visual pastiches 
Dick’s novel and Scott’s film draw from a complex cyberpunk science 
fiction universe which equates the stereotypes of detective literature, a 
variety of futuristic gadgets, and the cultural logics of late capitalism. 
Accordingly, one finds the traditional hero, whose task is to defend a 
community from an evil entity, living in a place where the setting and 
technology are clearly futuristic. Such place evokes a full range of values 
which characterizes the postmodern politics: the erasure of boundaries 
between the past and the present, a rearrangement of space, and the 
commodification of individuals which revolves around the definition 
brought to human subjectivity.
Although Dick’s novel and Scott’s film address these same features, 
in some parts both texts differ significantly. Do Androids Dream o f  
Electric Sheep? is a third person narrative which portrays a planet 
destroyed by a nuclear war. The story takes place in San Francisco in 1992. 
In this setting everything is artificially produced. Natural animals have
become almost extinct and have, thus, achieved a symbolic status. Thus 
Rick Deckard, the main protagonist, searches out the renegade replicants so 
as to afford a natural sheep. This fake background is the source of 
everything that is alienating, like mercerism, the state religion, the empathy 
box and the television sets. These features are omitted in the film, whose 
search for originality focuses on another element, namely photography.
The screen adaptation is a first person voice-over narrative which 
places the audience into the postindustrial, technologised society of Los 
Angeles in the year 2019. Blade Runner combines elements of the film noir 
of the forties and fifties with science fiction in a futuristic scenery. Anyone 
familiar with the film can recognize among such elements the film noir 
detective performed by Harrison Ford, the science fiction idea of a future 
world populated by masses of individuals, huge traffic jams, and the 
pervasive presence of artificial beings. In such scenery there is an 
emergence of a new politics which alters the meaning people give to things 
as it stresses previous aesthetic codes. The result is a complex cyberpunk 
aesthetic realized through visual narrative technique.
Scott’s film used the novel’s actions as the basis for a filmic narrative 
with striking visual effects which recycles the past as pastiche. In his visual 
pastiche, Scott draws from architectural aesthetics of all epochs and places 
to convey a link between past and present. A key question emerges when 
the past is brought into the present by means of photography, an element
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which is not explored in the written narrative. As a symbol of a past life, 
photography becomes a representation which undermines the individual’s 
identity.
These main differences between the novel and the film have as their 
counterpart a fundamental similarity. The structure of plot and characters 
that supports the novel and the film explores the same theme, that is, the 
definition of human subjectivity in late capitalist society. This society, 
whose technological advances have modified the postmodern sensibility to 
such a degree that one can hardly identify reality, undermines the 
opposition between natural and artificial beings. The individual who lives 
in this society is reduced to a commodified image which deals only with 
surface reflections. Such image fails to recognize conventional reality and 
its lived experience and places the individual in an unreal world of 
simulation.
At this point, I would like to take up the discussion raised at the 
beginning of my dissertation, where I state that the postmodern discourse 
threatens the discourse of the real by celebrating Baudrillard’s concept of 
simulacra. Such concept is introduced in the novel and in the film by 
means of replicants. These technologically developed beings redraw the 
boundaries between natural and artificial individuals as they are no longer 
distinguishable from natural individuals. The emerging notion of the 
individual is shaped according to a series of cultural formations which
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systematically deconstructs any unified concept of reality.
The world has become unreal as its social formations have been built 
on representations of lived experience. Everything has been reduced to the 
representation, the simulacrum, which reveals an illusion. Individuals, 
history and places are no longer real as they have been commodified and 
transformed into their own images. The ideology which permeates such 
world breaks boundaries and inserts the individual into a complex network 
of references which confuses organic and artificial bodies, historical and 
geographical discourses.
Lost in a world of signs which deals only in reflections, the 
postmodern individual is unable to identify a real or a simulated version of 
the postmodern self as the self has been fragmented and multiplied. The 
task of the postmodern individual is, thus, to construct an identity out of 
different images which undermine any unified concept of man and reality. 
The world ends up full of reconstructed truths and artificial beings which 
make problematic the question of defining humanity.
In Dick’s Do Androids Dream o f  Electric Sheep? and Scott’s Blade 
Runner, one finds the ambiguous image of human/replicant which opens up 
new grounds of discussion for the term humanity. In both works the 
individual is characterized according to his surface reflection which lacks 
in revealing his real identity. Humans and replicants turn out to be so alike
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that real identity behind simulacra becomes inconceivable. They become, as 
Baudrillard puts it, perfect copies of themselves and embody the 
hyperrealism of simulation.
Incapable of dealing with truth and simulation, the greatest difficulty 
of the postmodern individual is to achieve a specific understanding of 
individuality. In Dick’s novel and Scott’s film, natural and artificial beings 
differ from one another only in terms of the signifiers they can attach to 
themselves. Paradoxically, replicants end up being a contrast to the 
mechanical and dehumanized features attributed to human beings. In both 
texts there is a pervasive exchange of features between humans and 
replicants which turns the question of humanity around as one sees 
humanized machines and mechanized human beings.
The process of dehumanization is most clearly articulated in the film 
by Roy Batty, the lead replicant played by Rutger Hauer. Starting as a 
violent and sadistic individual who is able to crush the skull of his creator, 
he progressively achieves human status as he embodies humanity’s deepest 
concerns. This is most palpable in the battle scene when Roy saves 
Deckard’s life and teaches a lesson in compassion. In this scene, Roy 
carries a white dove that is released as he dies. The dove becomes a 
“symbol of charity and forgiveness.”(7) In Michael Ryan words, Roy 
himself “becomes a figure for Christ as he lowers his head and dies,n(2)
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A Christ-like figure, Roy becomes the personification of salvation/.?,) 
Like Christ, Roy bears a nail in his hand, and his decision of saving and 
forgiving his pursuer could be taken as examples of Christian charity and 
compassion. The analogy with Christ makes Roy an extremely complex 
character: he is human, but also divine, therefore better than human, but 
also a machine, therefore sub-human. The film ends up portraying Roy as a 
traditional hero who dies so that others can live. A question emerges then: 
‘Can one identify Roy as an artificial being with all its burdens when faced 
with such particular image?’
In the disorienting reversibility of roles between humans and 
replicants Roy evokes a more affectionate and humanly meaningful 
response than any of the so-called human characters portrayed in the film. 
Clearly, the spectator may accept Roy as human based on his compassion 
and gratitude, characteristics usually legitimated by human beings. No 
longer distinguishable from humans in physical and emotional terms, Roy 
becomes a perfect example of simulacrum, as he reaches the depthlessness 
proposed by postmodernism.
Roy enters the human discourse as his actions and beliefs turn out to 
be more ‘humanly’ acceptable. That is, Roy differs from other artificial 
individuals only in terms of the signifiers he attaches to himself, which give 
legitimacy to actions rather than to physical features. Ironically, it is his 
pursuer, Rick Deckard, the one who first succeeds in accepting Roy as a
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human being in the face of mutual concerns and affection.
By the same token, Deckard empathizes with other replicants like 
Luba Luft, in Dick’s novel, and Zhora, in Scott’s film. In the novel, 
Deckard has a reversed feeling in relation to Luba Luft and Phil Resch,
So much for the distinction between authentic living humans 
and humanoid constructs. In that elevator at the museum, he 
said to himself, I rode down with two creatures, one human, 
the other android...and my feelings were the reverse of those 
intended. Of those I’m accustomed to feel—am required to 
feel. (4)
Deckard has lost his sense of value because he is constrained within the 
cultural logics of a postmodern society which controls all the conditions 
that determine lived experience and its values. In Scott’s film, Deckard 
feels sorry for Zhora as he considers her a woman, just like Rachael.
There is, thus, a systematic deconstruction of the opposition between 
replicants and humans as the artificial beings enter the human discourse 
with all its burdens. Conventional devices fail to recognize Luba and Zhora 
as artificial beings because they have the full range of human responses 
expected from human beings. Similarly, Rachael embodies all the 
emotional baggage that labels her human. Even Deckard, the one who at 
first relegated Rachael to an artificial status, ends up portraying her as 
being so human that he refers to Rachael as ‘she’ instead of ‘it’. In other 
words, Rachael becomes a truly human person instead of a simple machine
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which imitates the so-called humans. Such aspect is highlighted when 
Rachael realizes that she is not a human being as she used to think. Her 
doubt about being human or not, her relationship with Deckard, namely a 
human being, and her decision of helping Deckard find the other replicants 
are steps which move her toward the human realm.
The issue of gender identity is central in the case of Rachael. In 
Deckard’s apartment, when Rachael sees the photographs over the piano 
and tries to look like the woman in the photo, she is building a female 
subjectivity. As Bruno puts it, Rachael succeeds in entering the human 
discourse because
she assumes a sexual identity, becomes a woman, and loves a 
man: Deckard, the blade runner. Rachael accepts the paternal 
figure and follows the path to a ‘normal’, adult, female, 
sexuality: she identifies her sex by first acknowledging the 
power of the other, the father, a man.”(l5)
Rachael enters the social order, acts according to its rules, and escapes the 
schizophrenic temporality of the replicants by accepting the paternal figure 
and being submissive to Deckard. Rachael’s relationship with Deckard 
begins to develop when she first accepts her artificial status and then tries 
to build a female narrative. She belongs to the same temporal coordinator 
as humans and, consequently, experiences the same feelings. As a final 
proof of her newly sexual identity, Rachael shoots Leon as he is almost 
killing Deckard, her lover.
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Ironically, Deckard embodies a variety of selves that produce 
disruptions in the so-called human behavior. In some moments, Deckard’s 
attitude towards the replicants he must kill and also his relationship with 
Rachael reduce him to a non-human status. That is, in the name of 
humanity Deckard ends up becoming less human. In these moments, when 
Deckard loses his human connections, he expresses the collapse of his 
identity. Deckard’s self is fragmented and he loses the symbolic identity 
which grants him a human status.
Deckard’s essential humanity is lost as he enters the postmodern 
discourse where the self ends up being an endless number of 
representations and fakes. The lack of a coherent self deprives the 
individual of his self identity as his identity is constructed out of other 
people’s identity. Such variety of identities resulting from a blending of 
boundaries into one another results in nonentity. The postmodern subject is, 
like Deckard, a non-subject as everything, even one’s inner memories, are 
artificially implanted. In other words, Deckard, like the replicants he 
searches out, can not find a real version of his self and is consequently 
relegated literally to a non-living state. Accordingly, Deckard and the 
replicants are trapped in their own reality as they can not have their real 
discourses.
In Dick’s Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? and Scott’s Blade 
Runner, humans and replicants deconstruct the stereotypes that define
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natural and artificial beings. The boundaries between natural and artificial 
have vanished and the individual becomes an imaginary ideological being 
who has no referent in reality. Such individual is thus a simulacrum as he 
emerges between the real and the representation and is neither one nor the 
other. This shift in perspective comes from the postmodern politics of signs 
which alter the meaning people give to themselves and the world around.
Still, the difficulty in fixing boundaries between humans and 
replicants in Dick’s novel and in Scott’s film is also related to the 
postmodern politics of time and space. The postmodern logics of time, 
which inserts the reader and the viewer into a network of historical 
references, contains past, present, and future. In both works fragments of 
the past and the future are available in the present only for their surface 
value, like the live animals in the novel, the architectural allusions in the 
film and the endless futuristic spaceships which pervade both works. These 
fragments keep the past alive and bring the future to the present.
Such pastiche shapes the postmodern identity which asserts that 
nothing is original, everything is a reproduction of previous features. To 
illustrate this aspect, one can highlight the costumes the characters wear. 
Coats revive myths of the past and postindustrial fashion recycles waste in 
the typical logic of late capitalism. The postmodern self is, thus, the result 
of a mix of fragments which produces a disordered subject. Consequently, 
this subject has to be defined in a different way, as simulacrum rather than
I l l
as authentic self.
In Dick’s novel and Scott’s film, the erasure of temporal coordinators 
is also sensed in spatial terms as characters share a place full of 
geographical displacements, from buildings which quote different places 
and times to people who portray features from all over the world. The 
megalopolis presented in both works locates Deckard and the other 
characters in a hyperreal world that prevents them from seeing beyond their 
simulated lives. The spatial dislocation presented in both works is a 
metaphor for the lack of boundaries between natural and artificial beings. 
In physical terms, human features have been dislocated by a set of 
technological apparatuses.
This postmodern society, which can not deal with time and space, 
ends up being a place where, as the imaginary politics of signs circulates 
endlessly, one can never reach the real. What remains are only 
representations of the real which sustain an illusion over another. Illusion 
has thus become the real. Living in such an unreal world deprived of any 
contact with conventional reality, the postmodern individual has his 
identity threatened. He is forced to be contented with a false version of his 
own self.
At this point, I want to go back to the question that has guided my 
work throughout: “What does it mean to be human in the postmodern
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world?” By challenging fundamental assumptions regarding the 
conventional notion of human being, namely an individual as opposed to a 
machine, this work searched to find a new definition of the term humanity 
taking into account Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? 
and Scott’s film Blade Runner. Concepts of humanity, self, space, and time 
had to be redefined according to the new order of things proposed by 
postmodernism.
As I have mentioned before, the postmodern individual, who has his 
most intimate life controlled and manipulated by late capitalism, is a 
subject of loss. Such is the dilemma of both, replicants and humans. I 
would like here to concentrate on one point, that of the metaphoric reversal 
of a typical image advanced by science fiction.
Conventional science fiction devices create individuals that, by 
appearance and behavior, can be considered humans. Such artificially 
developed subjects consist only of surface matrixes which represent the 
image itself. But in the texts discussed here, what at first seems to be just 
representations of reality, that is, replicants, end up becoming truly human 
beings in that replicants are highly intelligent thinking machines who 
simulate real thoughts. By the same token, the human mind also works like 
a computer. Considering this fact, one will find the mechanization of 
thoughts in humans that, like replicants, will carry out logic mind 
operations. If both work like computers, the difference between replicant’s
and human’s minds will be noticed on the way they organize the 
information they get. If the organization of data is the same, humans would 
no longer be models for replicants. They end up being equal.
The relationship between human discourse and artificial discourse 
creates a kind of moebian structure in which one can find at the other side 
the reverse of oneself. As Baudrillard puts it, “all the referentials 
intermingle their discourses in a circular moebian compulsion.”^  In other 
words, the relationship between humans and machines creates a kind of 
circular movement that prevents origins from being found. Transfixed to 
the other side of the metaphor, the human being simultaneously occupies 
both places in the same way that replicants do. Both of them remain trapped 
in this circular discourse.
So far, the question of humanity remains unanswered. Therefore, 1 
would like to highlight some ideas proposed by the two texts that I have 
analyzed. Certainly the first idea proposed by the two texts is that the 
definition of humanity requires constant broadening as one encounters 
individuals like Rachael and Roy. Such expansion has to occur in the 
reader’s and viewer’s minds as they are the ones who will come up with a 
definition. In this way, the definition of humanity will depend on individual 
observers. Obviously, one has to consider that no unified conception of 
humanity remains, as the postmodern context is full of contradictions.
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Secondly, the postmodern individual, like Deckard, lives in a society 
which not only controls his life but also deprives him of important and vital 
decisions, features that used to distinguish replicants from humans. 
Deckard, for example, is forced to accept the task of killing, that is retiring, 
replicants. Otherwise, he would be relegated to a lower status. Replicants 
and humans are in the same position and can no longer have control over 
their lives. Everything is already decided in advance so that the individual 
loses any capacity to exercise his free will. In postmodern society, the 
individual has no real concerns and ends up leading a life that is completely 
predetermined.
Lastly, the postmodern emerging sense of the individual, as a result of 
the collapse of boundaries between the so-called natural and artificial 
beings, ends up in an open-ended process. Certainly, the struggle to find the 
individual’s real identity is one step toward the human status, as in the 
search for the self the individual evokes a full range of human reponses. To 
conclude, what differs Dick’s novel and Scott’s film from traditional 
science fiction texts is that both works turn the question of humanity 
around as they ask: “Can such individuals be included as humans despite 
some of their non-human features?”
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1. Notes
1 RYAN, Michael and Douglas kellner. “Technophobia.” Alien Zone:
Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema. Verso, 
1990, p.64.
2 RYAN, p.64.
3 I am indebted to Thomas Burns for the suggestion that Roy is a Christ-
like figure. See Thomas Burns “Blade Runner, The Terminator, 
Robocop: The Figure of the Cyborg Warrior.” Unpublished paper, 
p. 15. See also Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner “Technophobia.”
4 DICK, Philip K. Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? Great Britain:
Grafton, 1972, p. 110.
5 BRUNO, Giuliana. “Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner.”
Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction 
Cinema. Verso, 1990, p. 190.
6 BAUDRILLARD, Jean. “Simulacra and Simulations.” Selected Writings.
Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 176.
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